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Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis:
A Positive Political Theory Perspective
Eric A. Posner†
Abstract: Cost-benefit analysis is analyzed using a model of agency delegation. In this model an
agency observes the state of the world and issues a regulation, which the president may approve or reject.
Cost-benefit analysis enables the president to observe the state of the world (in one version of the model),
or is a signal that an agency may issue (in another version). The roles of the courts, Congress, and interest
groups are also considered. It is argued that the introduction of cost-benefit analysis increases the
amount of regulation, including the amount of regulation that fails cost-benefit analysis; that the president has no incentive to compel agencies to issue cost-benefit analysis, because agencies will do so when
it is in the president’s interest, and otherwise will not do so; that presidents benefit from cost-benefit
analysis even when they do not seek efficient policies; that agencies and their supporters ought to endorse cost-benefit analysis, not resist it; and that cost-benefit analysis reduces the influence of interest
groups. Evidence for these claims is discussed. Finally, it is argued that courts should force agencies to
conduct cost-benefit analyses in ordinary conditions, but that they should not force agencies to comply
with them.

INTRODUCTION
In American Trucking Associations, Inc, v EPA,1 the D.C. Circuit struck down an EPA particulate matter regulation on the ground that the vague statute authorizing the regulatory activity
amounted to an unconstitutional delegation.2 The court said that in the next round of rulemaking the EPA needs to provide a quantitative justification of the regulation.3 The court evidently
believed that cost-benefit analysis would be an adequate decision procedure, but precedent
barred EPA from using that procedure.4 If EPA could not come up with an alternative quantitative procedure, it would not be able to regulate particulate matter pollution unless Congress
created a narrower standard for justifying regulations.
In Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA,5 the Fifth Circuit struck down an EPA regulation on the
ground that the cost-benefit justification was inadequate.6 EPA committed a multitude of costbenefit sins: discounting costs but not benefits,7 using inconsistent valuations for statistical
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draft.
1
175 F3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999), revd in part by Whitman v American Trucking Associations, Inc, 2001 US LEXIS 1952.
2
Id at 1036–37. This view was subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court. See Whitman v American Trucking Associations, Inc,
2001 US LEXIS 1952, *30–31.
3
Id at 1038–40.
4
Id at 1038 (“Cost-benefit analysis . . . is not available under decisions of this court.”)
5
947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991).
6
Id at 1229-30.
7
Id at 1218.

lives,8 refusing to quantify certain benefits, and refusing to repeat the analysis with better data
supplied by industry.9 The court remanded for a more adequate analysis.10
These cases reflect a trend of increasing judicial recognition of cost-benefit analysis as an
appropriate and possibly even necessary part of the regulatory process. This judicial trend parallels developments in other parts of the federal government, where cost-benefit has taken hold
and expanded in influence. But the academic literature has lagged these developments. Although many commentators criticize or defend cost-benefit analysis as an abstract normative
principle,11 few look at its role in institutional context, that is, as a device whose justification depends on its capacity to help authoritative institutions such as Congress, the presidency, and the
courts monitor subordinate institutions such as agencies.12
The article most directly concerned with the institutional aspect of cost-benefit analysis is
Cass Sunstein’s evaluation of the emerging jurisprudence of cost-benefit analysis.13 His approach
is pragmatic: he identifies the standards that courts apply when they review cost-benefit analyses, and supports them because they are reasonable and likely to enhance the consistency of
regulations. He avoids connecting his defense of cost-benefit “default rules” to a theoretical justification of cost-benefit analysis, arguing that cost-benefit analysis is entrenched in the government, the time for defending and criticizing the decision procedure is past, and the proper
focus is implementation.
Sunstein is right about the entrenchment of cost-benefit analysis in American government.
Reagan’s famous 1981 executive order directing regulatory agencies to comply with cost-benefit
analysis was met with a storm of protest.14 But when the Democrats took control of the presidency in 1993, they did not reverse this policy. Instead, Clinton issued an executive order that
endorsed cost-benefit analysis in a slightly modified form.15 Meanwhile, the annual number of
cost-benefit reports in the Federal Register has increased about sixfold since 1980, with no
slowdown during the Clinton years.16 Bills requiring agencies to use cost-benefit analysis have
been routinely proposed in Congress since 1995.17 Some federal regulatory statutes already re8

Id at 1218–19.
Id at 1227.
10 Id at 1230.
11 See, for example, Robert H. Frank, Why is Cost Benefit Analysis So Controversial? 29 J Legal Stud 913 (2000) (defending costbenefit analysis from a variety of philosophical criticisms); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of CostBenefit Analysis, 29 J Legal Studies 1005, 1032–33 (2000) (noting the limits of the use of cost-benefit analysis to answer certain social
questions, such as identifying which basic entitlements a citizen of a state should possess).
12 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, 29 J Legal Stud
1105, 1116–25 (2000) (evaluating the ways that agencies modify cost-benefit analysis in order to deal with preferences that are uninformed, adaptive, morally objectionable, or motivated by moral commitments); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis,
29 J Legal Stud 1059, 1060–61 (2000) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis may be justified because its narrow procedures help overcome the cognitive biases of the public and of administrative officials).
13 Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, Mich L Rev (forthcoming 2001).
14 Exec Order No 12291, 3 CFR 127, 128–29 (1981).
15 Exec Order No 12,866, 3 CFR 638, 639 (1993).
16 Searches on Westlaw in the Federal Register database of “cost /2 benefit,” “cost-benefit [or] benefit-cost,” and “cost-benefit
analysis [or] benefit-cost analysis” yielded hits of 211, 103, and 53 for 1980, and 1257, 556, and 378, for 1999. During the same period
the total number of annual entries appears to have increased between two and three times (based on neutral search criteria like
“household,” “mandatory,” and “substance”. Accordingly, cost-benefit analysis has become more important both relatively and absolutely.
17 Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S 746, 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 25, 1999) (ordering that all major rules issued by any
agency must be subject to a cost-benefit analysis); Regulatory Reform and Relief Act, HR 926, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 14, 1995), in
141 Cong Rec H 2630 (Mar 3, 1995) (same); Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S 343, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (1995), in 141
Cong Rec S 2057 (Feb 2, 1995) (same).
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quire it and many more are interpreted to allow it.18 Finally, cost-benefit analysis has spread
from the federal government to the states.19
But the popularity of cost-benefit analysis is not a sufficient reason for ignoring its theoretical justification. The jurisprudence of cost-benefit analysis cannot be detached from the reasons
for using it. A proper analysis of the roles of agencies and courts requires both a theory of costbenefit analysis, and evaluation of judicial and agency practice in light of this theory.
This Article analyzes cost-benefit analysis as a method by which the president, Congress, or
the judiciary controls agency behavior. It uses a model from the literature on positive political
theory to show why the president and Congress will often want agencies to perform costbenefit analyses. The model is also used to explore the impact of cost-benefit analysis on courts
and interest groups. The model generates testable predictions, including the prediction that introduction of cost-benefit analysis will increase the amount of regulation and also increase the amount of
inefficient regulation.
Several arguments emerge from the model. The first argument is that a common way of
justifying cost-benefit analysis—as a decision procedure that minimizes the sum of error costs
and administrative costs compared to other procedures—is incomplete. The problem with this
way of thinking is that the variable, error cost, covers two very different problems: (i) the problem that even an agency loyal to the president and Congress may make technical errors, such as
discounting the future too much or undervaluing health benefits; (ii) the problem that even an
epistemically perfect agency that makes no technical errors may implement projects that diverge from the goals of the president and Congress because the agency, or its chief, or its personnel, have their own divergent goals. The second problem is one of strategic behavior, and provides a basis for thinking of cost-benefit analysis as a technique (like Congressional oversight)
for monitoring and disciplining agencies.
The second argument of this paper is that cost-benefit analysis may serve a valuable role
even if the proper social goal is not efficiency. This point is important, as it resolves puzzles
identified by three radically different perspectives on agency regulation. Cost-benefit analysis is
a puzzle for interest group theory because interest group theory assumes that the president and
Congress seek to transfer resources to interest groups rather than maximize efficiency.20 Cost18 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 USC § 136(bb) (1994 & Supp 1996) (“unreasonable adverse effects on
the environment” is defined as “any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide”); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC § 2605(c) (1994) (requiring EPA
administrator to “consider and publish a statement with respect to “the effects of the substance on human health and the environment, the benefits of such substance for various uses, and “the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after
consideration of the effect on the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, and public
health”).For cases that interpret statutes to permit cost-benefit analysis, see Part IV.C. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,
Public Law No 104-4, 109 Stat 48, codified at 2 USC § 1501–04 (1994 & Supp 1995), is the only statute that creates a general costbenefit obligation, directed to all agencies, but it has had little effect because of a variety of exemptions. See United States General
Accounting Office, Unfunded Mandates: Reform Has Had Little Effect on Agencies’ Rulemaking Actions, GAO/GGD-98-30 (1998).
There have been efforts in the other direction, however. See Arthur Fraas, The Role of Economic Analysis in Shaping Environmental Policy, L & Contemp Probs 113, 116–17 (1991) (describing legislation passed in the late 1980s that limited the use of cost-benefit analysis
in a variety of environmental statutes).
19 See Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29 J Legal Stud 873, 873–74 (2000) (noting
that many states have started to require agencies to assess the economic impact of all proposed rules).
20 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Introduction, 29 J Legal Stud 837, 839–41 (2000) (noting that, under a government
entirely driven by public choice factors, it is hard to imagine a normative argument in favor of cost-benefit analysis); Eric A. Posner,
Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Solution to a Principal-Agent Problem, 53 Admin L Rev 289 (2001); Gary S. Becker, A Comment on the Conference on Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J Legal Stud 1151–52 (2000) (discussing cost-benefit analysis as it applies in the interest group
competition model of political choice).
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benefit analysis is a puzzle for welfare economists because it does not implement a plausible
welfare standard such as the Pareto principle.21 And cost-benefit analysis is a puzzle for critics
from the left, who point out that it undervalues environmental goods and the interests of the
poor.22 We will show that these puzzles are solved when cost-benefit analysis is put in the
proper institutional context. The purpose of requiring agencies to perform cost-benefit analysis
is not to ensure that regulations are efficient; it is to ensure that elected officials maintain power
over agency regulation.23 Evaluation of cost-benefit analysis should be based on its usefulness
for disciplining agencies and enhancing the control of elected officials, not on its instantiation of
ethical principles that elected officials may or may not share.24 Many criticisms of cost-benefit
analysis confuse the institutional justification of cost-benefit analysis and the normative goals of
those who elect to use it.
The third argument is that the literature on cost-benefit analysis conflates the monitoring
and enforcement aspects of cost-benefit analysis, and the different ways that enforcement can
occur. Agencies that base decisions on flawed cost-benefit analysis could be subject to political
sanctions or legal sanctions. Political sanctions are punishments inflicted by the political principals themselves, including the president disciplining the agency head, or blocking or delaying
the regulation, and Congress enacting a statute that reverses the regulation or an appropriations
bill that reduces the agency’s budget. Legal sanctions are judicial decisions vacating the regulation. Both approaches are used in the U.S. government, and each has distinctive implications for
the regulatory process.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Part I introduces a model of the relationship between
the president and an agency. This simple auditing model shows that cost-benefit analysis can
improve the outcomes of regulatory decisions from the president’s perspective even in the absence of enforcement by the courts. Part II complicates the model by considering different goals
that a president might have; introducing Congress, the courts, and interest groups; and accounting for cost-benefit analysis’ relationship with other devices used by the president and Congress
for disciplining agencies. After a brief discussion of empirical evidence in Part III, Part IV examines the normative implications of the analysis. It argues among other things that cost-benefit
analysis may be justified as a device for institutional control even if the standard criticisms of

21

See I.M.D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics (2d ed. 1957).
See, for example, Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 Regulation 33, 35–36, 38–40 (Jan–Feb 1981) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis ignores the possibility that some actions should be undertaken despite costs, and also ignores the
possibility that some benefits should not or cannot have prices attached to them).
23 Compare Matthew D. , Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J
L, Econ & Org 243, 246 (1987) who argue that the purpose of administrative law is not fairness, as is often argued, but that “of helping elected politicians retain control of policymaking.”
24 Many criticisms of cost-benefit analysis miss this point. See, for example, Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the CostBenefit Standard, 29 J Legal Stud 971, 972–73 (2000) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis’s “underlying normative standard of choice
makes no room for intelligent deliberation about how best to use our resources”); Nussbaum, 29 J Legal Stud at 1032–33 (cited in
note 11); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L J 1981, 2042–64 (1998) (noting flaws with cost-benefit
analysis, such as an improper discounting of future lives and the lack of quantifiability of many risks and benefits); David Copp, The
Justice and Rationale of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23 Theory & Decisions 65, 74–77 (July 1987) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis incorporates an unacceptable principle of justice, giving greater weight to the welfare of better-off members of society than the welfare of
the poor); Kelman, 5 Regulation at 35–36 (cited in note 22) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis does not consider the fact that some actions should be undertaken even if the benefits are seemingly less than the costs). And others who take a moderate view, and argue
only that cost-benefit analysis should be broadened, neglect the institutional question. See, for example, Amartya Sen, The Discipline
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J Legal Stud 931 (2000) (noting and defending foundational demands of cost-benefit analysis, and arguing that cost-benefit analysis is a general discipline with broad application).
22
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this methodology—that it undervalues hard-to-measure goods, for example, or that it overvalues the interests of the wealthy—are valid. It also argues that the proper role of the judiciary is
to require agencies to perform cost-benefit analyses competently but not necessarily to force
agencies to comply with them.
I. MODEL
The best-developed work on the relationship between agencies, the president, Congress,
and the courts can be found in the literature on positive political theory. The literature treats this
relationship as a principal-agent problem, in which the “principal”—usually Congress, a congressional committee, a legislative coalition, or the president—delegates authority to the
“agent,” that is, the regulatory agency. Delegation is attractive because the agency can develop
expertise and use this expertise to implement projects that best satisfy the principal’s goals. But
delegation has this attractive result only if the agency is loyal to the principal. The problem with
delegation is that the agency may use its power to pursue its own goals—that is, the goals of the
agency’s chief or personnel—rather than the principal’s. To minimize these “agency costs,” the
principal sets up laws and institutions designed to monitor the agency and sanction it when it
acts improperly. Well-studied examples include the congressional committee system and notice
and comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.25
A simple way of understanding how cost-benefit analysis changes the relationship between
principals and agency is to imagine that it converts a relationship of asymmetric information to
one of full information. Without cost-benefit analysis, the principals are not at a complete loss,
because they can infer that certain projects—very high value projects, it turns out—benefit or
harm them; but they will refuse to consent to low value projects that may make them worse off.
With cost-benefit analysis the principals now can accept or reject the project on the basis of direct observation of its consistency with their interests. Understanding cost-benefit analysis, then,
involves comparing a model in which principals have complete information about the agency’s
activities and a model in which they have incomplete information. In both models the agency
can take advantage of its expertise and position to propose new projects, and the principals can
punish an agency that proposes projects that the principals do not like; all that varies between
the two models is how much information the principals have about the agency’s actions.
The comparison, as we shall see, yields a number of surprising results. Because agencies retain their agenda-setting power even after the cost-benefit analysis requirement is imposed on
them, the projects they choose will often fail cost-benefit analysis and nonetheless be approved
by the principals. Indeed, because cost-benefit analysis allows the principals to trust agencies
more than when agencies have an information advantage, there should be more regulation—not
less—after cost-benefit analysis is introduced. Further, cost-benefit analysis will be desirable
even when the principals do not seek efficient outcomes. The reason is that while cost-benefit
analysis reduces the information asymmetry, it remains in the principals’ discretion whether to
punish agencies that fail to abide by it. If the principals do not seek efficient outcomes, they will
still find cost-benefit data useful in determining whether a particular project serves their inter25 For an overview of this research, see David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers (1999). A critical review by a
legal scholar can be found in Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law 118–30 (Yale
1997).
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ests. Finally, it turns out that the proper role of courts may be to force agencies to conduct good
cost-benefit analyses, but not to force agencies to comply with them.
A.

What Is Cost-Benefit Analysis?

Cost-benefit analysis is sometimes treated as a loose balancing of the advantages and disadvantages of a project, but this is not what is at stake in the policy dispute. The policy dispute
concerns the process by which the welfare effects of projects are determined. When an agency
conducts a cost-benefit analysis, it may spend thousands or millions of dollars collecting and
analyzing data. The data usually come from studies of market behavior or surveys of consumer
preferences, and the analysis often involves a great deal of extrapolation. Consider a proposed
regulation to require the installation of scrubbers in the smokestacks of certain factories. The
cost of the regulation will be calculated from market data on the price of the scrubbers, which
must also take account of potential technological advances that may reduce that price. The
benefit of the regulation will be determined using scientific studies on the effects of the pollutant on people’s health and property. Health benefits will be calculated in terms of reduction of
medical costs, and, if lives or life years are saved, in terms of the value of statistical lives—which
themselves are calculated from studies that determine from market data how much money
people are willing to accept for small risks of death. If the pollutant causes damage to the environment, surveys will be used to determine how much people are willing to pay for clear air, or
to preserve wildlife. The costs and benefits also must be discounted to reflect the passage of
time. And alternative regulations must be considered; for example, shutting down the plants or
installing another kind of scrubber may be more cost-effective. When the hard work of data collection and analysis is completed, the comparison of costs and benefits is straightforward.
Converting this messy procedure into an assumption in a model is difficult, but there are
three reasonable approaches. The first approach is to assume that an agency can perform an accurate cost-benefit analysis at no cost, and the agency is incapable of producing a fake costbenefit analysis, that is, a cost-benefit analysis that justifies an inefficient regulation. The second
approach is to assume that cost-benefit analysis is expensive but accurate. A cost-benefit analysis will reveal that a regulation is cost-justified or not at a certain cost; to falsify the results, for
example, to show that an inefficient regulation is cost-justified, the cost is higher or infinite. The
third approach is to assume that cost-benefit analysis is costly but relatively easy to fake. Any
regulation can be justified with a cost-benefit analysis, but finding data and making calculations
are always costly.26
All three assumptions have support in the literature, and no doubt the truth is somewhere
in between. In some cases data are already available, studies have been done, and the cost of
compiling these sources and publishing them is trivial compared to the other administrative
costs incurred by the agency. In other cases, data must be gathered through expensive surveys
and studies, but the regulation affects only goods and services whose values are easy to measure. When consensus among experts can be achieved because the data are clear and the procedures are uncontroversial, it would be very expensive—perhaps infinitely expensive—to show

26 The fourth possibility—that cost-benefit analysis is cheap and easy to fake—would undermine the argument, but does not
seem plausible.
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that an inefficient regulation is cost-justified.27 In still other cases the regulation affects the value
of hard-to-measure goods, like environmental amenities, and so a plausible cost-benefit justification, or critique, can always be made. Cost-benefit analysis is expensive because surveys must
be conducted and experts retained, but the intangibles are significant enough to leave the
agency with wide discretion.
It is important to understand the relationship between cost-benefit analysis, efficiency, and
the normative goals of elected officials. When I say that a project or regulation is “efficient,” I
mean that it passes the Kaldor-Hicks standard: the beneficiaries of the project gain enough that
they could overcompensate those who are harmed by the project. A project that passes a costbenefit analysis is not necessarily efficient for several reasons. One is that cost-benefit analysis
monetizes the costs and benefits, whereas Kaldor-Hicks does not, and under certain conditions
a project whose benefits and costs are monetized will fail a cost-benefit analysis while passing
the Kaldor-Hicks standard, and vice versa.28 More important, cost-benefit analysis in the real
world unavoidably involves estimates of hard-to-measure things, like human lives and environmental amenities, so that in practice a cost-benefit analysis may provide support for inefficient regulations.29 The accuracy of a cost-benefit analysis depends on the conditions under
which it is used.
Accordingly, when I say that a project is efficient, I mean that it is efficient in ordinary conditions, that is, where there are no special problems of monetization or valuation. But this leads
to a further point, and that is that I do not intend to imply that efficient projects are socially desirable ones. The only normative assumption of this analysis is that agencies should implement
projects that are desired by Congress and the president. If these principals do not seek efficient
projects, then it is not assumed that agencies should disobey the principals and implement efficient projects. Parenthetically, it should be noted that there are many cases in which efficient
projects will not be socially desirable, so they will not be pursued by presidents and Congresses
who seek to serve the public interest. For example, projects that redistribute wealth to the poor
are not efficient but may be desirable, and these projects include those whose redistributive effect are a small component of a larger purpose, like health regulations that assume that the statistical value of the lives of the poor is as high as the statistical value of the lives of the wealthy.
Projects that are designed to change people’s preferences because these preferences are distorted
or poorly informed will also frequently be inefficient (because efficiency always is measured on
the basis of existing preferences) but socially desirable.30
Efficiency, then, is not used as a normative criterion but as an analytic concept in a positive
analysis. One of the main points of the argument is that government principals who are interested in goals other than efficiency will in many situations want agencies to perform costbenefit analysis, even though cost-benefit analysis evaluates projects on the basis of efficiency or
a close approximation.

27 See W. Norton Grubb, Dale Whittington, and Michael Humphries, The Ambiguities of Benefit-Cost Analysis: An Evaluation of
Regulatory Impact Analyses under Executive Order 12291, in V. Kerry Smith, ed, Environmental Policy under Reagan’s Executive Order: The
Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis121, 154–59 (North Carolina 1984) (discussing the quality of cost-benefit analyses from the early 1980’s).
28 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L J 165 (1999).
29 See id at 172–76 (giving examples of cost-benefit analyses in practice that monetized hard-to-measure benefits) .
30 See id at 220 (giving the example of a ban on narcotics as a welfare-justified paternalist project).
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B.

The Model

We use a model developed by Epstein and O’Halloran to examine the role of interest
groups in Congressional oversight of agencies.31 The model, as we reinterpret it, involves two
characters, the President and the Agency. Later we will assign the role of principal to Congress
and sometimes to general “government principals,” that is, either President or Congress. There
are three events: (1) Agency, but not President, observes the status quo; (2) Agency proposes a
project; and (3) President approves or rejects the project.32 The relevant variables are depicted in
Figure 1.
______________________________
–1
w
P=0
A
1
Figure 1
w = –A
The line extending from –1 to 1 represents the degree to which there is under- or overregulation from a cost-benefit perspective, with w representing the status quo at time 1.33 When w =
0, the efficient level of regulation exists. When w > 0, too much regulation exists, for example,
environmental regulations prevent the production of goods whose value exceeds the cost of pollution. When w < 0, too little regulation exists. For example, industry pollutes when pollution
control devices could be installed at low cost. Thus, in Figure 1 the status quo is one of underregulation.
The letters “P” and “A” represent the “ideal points” of President and Agency. When P = 0,
as depicted, President seeks efficient outcomes. But President may seek outcomes that are inefficient from a cost-benefit perspective but desirable for other reasons. P < 0 when, for example,
President values environmental goods less than the average person does; P > 0 when President
values these goods more. For the time being, we assume that P = 0, but we relax this assumption
in a later section. As for Agency, we assume that A > P on the assumption that agencies are generally more interventionist than presidents are.34
The players want to minimize the distance between the policy outcome and their ideal
point; they do not care whether the outcome exceeds or falls short. For example, a president

31 David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and Bureaucracy, 11 J L, Econ &
Org 227, 232–46 (1995) (setting forth a model of interest group influence on agencies and Congress). An alternative, equally plausible approach, would hold that the principal can audit the agent at some cost. See Jeffrey S. Banks and Barry R. Weingast, The Political
Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information, 36 Am J Pol Sci 509, 512–15 (1992). But this would require a more complex
model, and does not yield different insights.
32 The president does not always have the legal authority to reject a regulation proposed by an agency. Viscusi notes that OMB
has been unable to block regulations that are based on valuations of statistical lives significantly above the accepted range. W. Kip
Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J Leg Stud 843, 854 (2000). But the White House can almost always hold up the regulation for a period of
time, see W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk 265–70 (Oxford 1992) (giving examples, drawn
mostly from automobile regulations in the 1980s), and Thomas O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality 282–88 (1991). and, as we discuss
below, the president may have other ways of punishing an agency that proposes an undesired regulation. See Part II.E.
33 The value w is uniformly distributed with mean equal to 0.
34 This seems to be built into their culture. Agencies are charged by statute with the obligation to do something. If they do
nothing, they might be eliminated, and at the least doing nothing is likely to be demoralizing. Thus, agency personnel will want to
intervene, and agency heads, though often outsiders, will be under pressure to defer.
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with an ideal point of 0 is indifferent between policy outcomes 0.5 and –0.5, and prefers 0.4 (or –
0.4) to either.35
At time 1, Agency but not President observes the value of w. Agency’s informational advantage is due to its institutional expertise. At time 2, Agency proposes a regulation or project. This
agenda-setting power is due to Agency’s special legal authority to issue regulations. The regulation is represented by a number r. If r > 0, then the project increases the amount of regulation.
An example is the requirement that scrubbers be used in smokestacks. If r < 0, then the project
reduces the amount of regulation—for example, eliminating the rule that scrubbers must be
used. If r = 0, the status quo does not change. The outcome of the regulation is simply w + r: the
regulation moves the world along the number line away from the status quo.
At time 3, President approves or rejects the project. Rejection means that the status quo
prevails (w). Acceptance means that the regulation is implemented (w + r). Because President
does not directly observe w, the decision to accept or reject must be based on inferences from
the values of r and A, which President does observe. It should be mentioned that in reality
presidents do not have the power to reverse a project, but may fire the agency head if the
agency is not an independent agency. We discuss this complication in Part II.E.
Because A ≠ P, Agency and President do not have the same goals, but their interests are not
completely conflicting either. Consider the location of w in Figure 1. Both President and Agency
prefer a regulation, r > 0, because both seek a more regulated environment. President’s ideal
regulation is r = –w, for such a regulation would bring the status quo to 0, President’s ideal
point. Agency’s ideal regulation is r = –w +A, because this higher value regulation would bring
the status quo to A, Agency’s ideal point. Observe that President would be willing to accept a
regulation up to r = 2w. The reason is that +w is no worse for President than –w; each outcome is
the same distance from 0. And a similar point can be made about Agency. Each player is willing
to accept a range of outcomes superior to the status quo, but their ideal outcome is just one
point within that range.
Finally, it should be observed that the degree to which Agency and President’s goals converge or diverge depends on the location of the status quo. We have already seen a case in
which their goals partially converge: when w = –A. Their goals diverge when w is, say, A/2.
When w = A/2, Agency benefits only from r > 0, while President benefits only when r < 0. For
example, President believes that pollution controls are too strict, and Agency believes that they
are too lax. In the earlier case, President and Agency believe that pollution controls are too lax,
but Agency wants to strengthen them more than President does.
C.

The Equilibrium without Cost-Benefit Analysis (Incomplete Information)

Given the assumptions described so far and some technical assumptions that need not detain us,36 an equilibrium can be described, in which outcomes are a function of w, A, and P. The
equilibrium is represented graphically as the thick line (not the line of dashes) in Figure 2.37
35 Formally, President’s utility is UP = -(r + w)2. Agency’s utility is UA = -(r + w – A)2, where President’s ideal point is P = 0, and
Agency’s ideal point is A > P. Squaring the expressions ensures that parties do not attach special importance to whether the policy
outcome is negative or positive; it also creates risk aversion.
36 See Epstein and O’Halloran, 11 J, L Econ & Org at 248–49 (cited in note 31) (setting forth formal assumptions needed to
solve for equilibrium).
37 The figure is from id at 236, figure 2; the complete information equilibrium has been added to their figure. The incomplete
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<<Figure 2 here>>
The horizontal axis represents the status quo, w. The vertical axis represents the value of
the regulation, r. The lines labeled A and P represent the ideal regulations for Agency and President. For example, when w = –1, Agency’s ideal project is r = 1 + A, which produces the outcome
A (–1 + 1 + A), and President’s is r = 1, which produces outcome P = 0. The lines labeled AP and
PA represent the limits of the regulations that Agency would be willing to propose and that
President would be willing to accept. When w = –1, Agency would be made no worse off by
regulation, r = 2 + 2A, which would produce the outcome 1 + 2A, which is no farther from A
than the status quo (1 + 2A – A = 1 + A = A – (–1)). President would be made no worse off by
regulation, r = 2, because +1 is no farther from 0 than –1 is. In short, regulations along AP are the
worst (from Agency’s perspective) that Agency would be willing to propose, and regulations
along PA are the worst (from President’s perspective) that President would be willing to approve.
To understand the equilibrium, observe that there are four distinct regions in which the
outcome bears a different relationship to the status quo, w. These are summarized in Table 1.
Each row corresponds to one of the four distinctive regions on the graph in Figure 2.

Value of w
–1 to –3A
–3A to –A
–A to A
A to 1

Value of r
A–w
4A
0
A–w

Outcome
A
A to 3A
–A to A
A

Improvement
for Agency
1 + A to 4A
0 to 4A
0
0 to 1 – A

Improvement
for President
1 – A to 2A
0 to 2A
0
0 to 1 – A

Table 1: Incomplete Information Equilibrium
Imagine that President is conservative, and Agency is the EPA and controlled by liberal but
not extreme environmentalists. Let’s say that A = 0.3. Even though President does not directly
observe w, in some cases President can infer the value of w, and thus make an informed decision
about whether to accept or reject the project. Suppose, for example, r < 0. Let us say that r = –0.2.
President can infer that w = 0.5, and thus will approve the project because it produces an outcome closer to 0 (namely, 0.3). How does President make this inference? If w were less than 0.5,
say w = 0.4, then Agency would propose r = –0.1, not r = –0.2. If w were greater than 0.5, then
Agency could do better by proposing a more extreme (negative) project. Because Agency’s proposal of r = –0.2 is rational only if w = 0.5, and because under these circumstances the regulation
makes President better off, President approves the regulation. Anticipating this, Agency would
be willing to propose the regulation in the first place. This is like the liberal EPA proposing a deregulatory project because it believes that existing regulations do more harm than good. A
conservative president has no reason to doubt the rationale for the regulation. Note that Agency
information equilibrium was derived by Thomas Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An
Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, 3 J L, Econ & Org 287 (1987).
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servative president has no reason to doubt the rationale for the regulation. Note that Agency
does not choose the best project for President (r = –0.5), but instead uses its agenda-setting
power to choose a regulation that is ideal for it, Agency, and good but not ideal for President.
This is the situation in Row 4.
Imagine now that Agency proposes an extremely high-value regulation of r = 1.3. President
can infer that w = –1. The reason is simply that given w = –1, r = 1.3 produces an outcome equal
to Agency’s ideal of 0.3. President would approve this project because 0.3 is closer to 0 than –1
is. This is like the liberal EPA proposing an expensive ban on chlorofluorocarbons because of
their great threat to the environment and human health. The conservative president believes the
EPA because a moderately liberal EPA would not benefit from such an extreme project unless
the environmental problem were serious. This is the situation in Row 1.
The moderately liberal EPA now proposes a low-value project of r = 0.1. President might
fear that w = 0.2, in which case the project would make President worse off, and for that reason
President might want to reject the project. However, it is also possible that w = –0.2, in which
case President would want to approve the project. Unlike the cases involving negative value
projects and very high value projects, President cannot infer the value of w, and so will assume
that it equals its average, namely 0. But if w = 0, which is President’s ideal point, any project
would make President worse off. Accordingly, President rejects low-value projects. Anticipating
these rejections, Agency does not propose these projects in the first place. This is the situation in
Row 3.38
Finally, for a range of values of w, Agency can provide limited information to President
about the status quo by proposing regulations that are higher valued than Agency’s ideal. In
Row 2, r = 1.2 (4 x 0.3) when –0.9 < w < –0.3. To see why this is an equilibrium, observe that
when Agency proposes r = 1.2, President knows that w is on average –0.6. President approves
the regulation because r + w is no farther from P = 0 than w is. Given that President will approve
this regulation, Agency has an incentive to propose it. If w = –0.8, the outcome is 0.4. The reason
that Agency cannot propose the superior (for both President and Agency) regulation of r = 1.1 is
that if President approved such regulations – that is, if President approved any regulation r, regardless of how low r is – then Agency would be able to propose and obtain approval for (for
example) r = 0.5 when w = –0.2. This latter regulation makes President worse off than in the
status quo. Agency cannot issue a regulation r < 1.2, because on average such regulations will
make President worse off for the values of w for which it is in the Agency’s interest to issue lowvalue regulations. Row 2 contains the cases in which Agency overregulates in order to persuade
President that there is a serious problem.
The last point is that A could be higher or lower than 0.3. When A is close to 0, President
and Agency have similar interests. When A is close to 1, President and Agency have very different interests. When their interests converge, President knows that Agency will propose projects
that President likes. Rows 1 and 4 expand to cover nearly all the cases. Most projects will be approved, and few will be distorted by signaling. When their interests diverge, President cannot

38 This is like the Lemons equilibrium: because of incomplete information it is impossible to “trade,” that is, agree on a project
that would make both parties better off when -.3 < w < 0. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q J of Econ 488 (1970) (describing the lemons model as it applies to automobiles, insurance, credit markets,
and the employment of minorities).

11

trust Agency except in cases of negative value regulations or high value positive regulations.
Rows 2 and 3 expand to cover nearly all the cases. Few projects will be approved, and those that
are will usually be distorted by signaling.
From President’s perspective, three things are preventing Agency from making optimal
choices. First, the divergence between Agency’s interests and President’s interests causes Agency
to prefer different projects. Second, Agency’s agenda setting power—which results from its ability to move first and make a take-it-or-leave-it offer—enables it to choose nonideal projects for
President even when President can infer the value of w. Third, incomplete information prevents
some mutually beneficial projects from being proposed, and causes Agency to distort other
beneficial projects in the direction of greater than necessary regulation.
D.

The Equilibrium with Cost-Benefit Analysis (Full Information)

Now let us introduce cost-benefit analysis, which is initially conceived to be costless and
perfectly accurate. Agency can, without expending any resources, produce a cost-benefit analysis, which will be understood as a statement about whether r = –w; in which case the project
passes, otherwise the project fails.39 This follows from our assumption that the efficient outcome
is 0 on the policy line. For now, we assume that Agency is obligated to produce the cost-benefit
analysis, perhaps on the theory that if it does not, it will be punished by President.40
These assumptions transform the incomplete information game described above into a full
information game. For many values of w, the equilibrium project with cost-benefit analysis is
the same as the equilibrium project with incomplete information. But for a range of values, the
equilibria diverge. In Figure 2 the thick line of dashes represents the outcomes for which the
complete information equilibrium that diverges from the incomplete information equilibrium;
otherwise, the equilibria are the same (the thick unbroken line elsewhere). The two equilibria
are also compared in Table 2.41
Value of w

–1 to –3A
–3A to –A
–A to 0
0 to A
A to 1

Value of r
(asymmetric
information)
A–w
4A
0
0
A–w

Value of r (full
information)
A–w
A–w
–2w
0
A–w

Difference Difference
for
for
Agency
President
0
0
3A + w
3A + w
2w
0
0
0
0
0

Table 2: Comparison of Equilibria

39 An alternative assumption is that the cost-benefit analysis reveals only whether the project improves the status quo in the
direction of efficiency; that is whether |w+r| < |w|.
40 We return to this issue in Parts I.E, I.F, and I.G.
41 The description of the complete information equilibrium is taken from Epstein and O’Halloran, note 25; it was originally derived by Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agencies, and the Status Quo, 33 Pub Choice 27
(1978).
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We have added a row to the table because the full information equilibrium has an extra
partition between –A and A.
In comparing the equilibria (columns two and three), notice that there is no change in rows
one and five. The reason is that when w is high or low enough, Agency’s proposal of a high
(positive or negative) value project reveals the location of w. Because President has full information—although this is endogenous rather than the result of the cost-benefit analysis—a costbenefit analysis cannot reveal additional information to President, and thus will not change behavior. For example, imagine that A = 0.3, and Agency proposes a project r = 1.3. President
knows that w = –1 for the reasons given in the Part II.C. Accordingly, a cost-benefit analysis that
revealed that w = –1 would not give President new information, and thus would not change behavior in equilibrium.
Also notice that there is no change in row four. Suppose that A = 0.3 and w = 0.1. Agency
can improve its utility only by choosing r > 0, but any r > 0 would move the outcome farther
from President’s ideal point of 0. With full information, President will not approve any project
that Agency would want to propose. With incomplete information, the similar result has a
slightly different reason. President knows that any low-value project, given a relatively high A,
may be such a transfer, and accordingly rejects any low-value project. The region of rejection is
larger in the incomplete information case (rows three and four) because President’s uncertainty
leads to rejection of projects that on average make President worse off. With full information, the
subset of projects that in fact make President better off are approved.
Continuing with row three, it is necessary to explain why with complete information
Agency proposes r = –2w (which is greater than 0, given that w is negative), rather than r = A –
w. The reason is that if –A ≤ w ≤ 0, President would reject Agency’s ideal project, r = A – w, because such a project would produce an outcome farther from 0 (but positive rather than negative) than w.42 If A = 0.5, and w = –0.2, President would not approve r = A – w = 0.7, because the
resulting outcome, 0.5, is farther from 0 than –0.2 is. President would approve at most r = –2w =
0.4, because the resulting outcome, 0.2, is no farther from 0 than the status quo of –0.2. President
and Agency both benefit from a project, r > 0, when w is close to, but less than, 0. President will
not, however, approve a project of such high value that it implements A if A is worse for President than the status quo.
Row two concerns the case where, in the incomplete information model, Agency signals to
President that w is relatively low by implementing a higher than ideal (from Agency’s perspective) project. With complete information, signaling is no longer necessary. When w < – A, President will approve Agency’s best project A – w. This project will result in outcome A, which is of
course closer to President’s ideal point, 0, than a status quo that is lower than –A. The reasoning
is the same as for row one.
The comparison of the two equilibria yields a number of surprising, important insights. As
one would expect, introduction of cost-benefit analysis results in better projects from the perspective of President and of social welfare. However, even with full information Agency can ex-

42 For example, for w = -A/2, Agency’s ideal project, r = (3/2)A, would give President utility of –A2, whereas the status quo
gives President utility of –A2/4. See note 35 for the definition of President’s utility function. To avoid rejection, Agency must propose
a project that President is willing to accept, namely, r = -2w. In the example, project r = -2w yields presidential utility UP = -A2/4,
which is no worse than the status quo.
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ploit its bargaining power—that is, its power to propose a project, which President can only accept or reject—and it will do so by biasing most projects in favor of greater regulation. In other
words (see row 3), introduction of cost-benefit analysis will result in the approval of many projects that
fail cost-benefit analysis.
Another insight is that the introduction of cost-benefit analysis will result in more regulation but
less extreme regulation (see rows 2 and 3). The reason is that without cost-benefit analysis President cannot trust the agency much. A President that does not trust Agency will reject low-value
projects, and thus Agency has no incentive to propose them in the first place. In a moderate
range, Agency will propose more aggressive projects than even it wants, as a way to signal to
President that the status quo is bad. Introducing cost-benefit analysis enables President to trust
Agency more, so more regulation will occur. But because signaling is no longer necessary, the
regulation will exhibit less variance. Both President and Agency are made better off, and Agency more
so than President because of its bargaining power.
This result can be seen in Figure 3, in which outcomes rather than project values are indexed on the y-axis. President wants a horizontal line along the x-axis, which is also the efficient
outcome. Agency wants a horizontal line at A. The complete information equilibria are on average closer to A and to P = 0 than the incomplete information equilibria, but the complete information equilibria, like the incomplete information equilibria, are on average closer to A than to
P.43 If you erase the line between –A and A, the remaining lines show actual regulations (rather
than refusals to regulate). It is clear that regulation with cost-benefit analysis occurs for more
values of w—that is, for more states of the world—and that it is less extreme.
<<Figure 3 here>>
Although the analysis is still at a preliminary stage, it should be clear that cost-benefit
analysis should not necessarily be objectionable to agencies or even to pro-regulation interest
groups like environmental organizations. The insight is that when the president cannot determine what an agency is doing, the likely response is not to give it free rein but, on the contrary,
to rein it in. An agency and its supporters might prefer a world in which the president lets it do
whatever it wants, but that is not an option. Given the choice between submitting to cost-benefit
analysis and losing the president’s support, the agency—and the interest groups—will prefer
the former. That cost-benefit analysis improves outcomes for both the agency and the president
is clear from Table 2 and Figure 3. That may be why cost-benefit analysis has, despite many
complaints, persisted as a major instrument of regulation.

43 It is also more likely that agencies will be created when cost-benefit analysis is an available tool than when it is not. The reason that cost-benefit analysis leads to more regulation and/or more agencies is that the president and Congress can trust agencies to
engage in less rent extraction, and to choose projects closer to their ideal points. There is a related point much discussed in the literature. When politicians can exert greater control over agencies, they are more likely to create agencies in the first place. Inability to
control agencies—for example, because the agencies do not affect organized interest groups that will inform politicians when the
agencies go astray—results in fewer agencies than would exist in a world with lower monitoring costs. See, for example, Banks and
Weingast, 36 Am J Pol Sci at 515–18 (cited in note 31) (establishing that politicians prefer agencies that have lower auditing costs,
hence making the agencies easier to monitor and control).
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E.

Endogenizing Cost-Benefit Analysis

The analysis so far takes a shortcut by assuming that cost-benefit analysis transforms an incomplete information game into a complete information game, rather than directly modeling
the agency’s use of cost-benefit analysis. This was done for expository clarity. Allowing the
agency to choose cost-benefit analysis does not change the results much, although it raises a
new puzzle about why agencies need to be ordered to perform and report cost-benefit analyses
rather than being willing to do so on their own.
Imagine that Agency has the option of issuing a cost-benefit analysis at the same time that
it proposes a project. Let us suppose that cost-benefit analysis does not cost zero, but does have
some small cost k which is invariant with respect to the efficiency of the project.44 President may,
as before, accept or reject the project. Initially, observe that Agency has no incentive to issue the
cost-benefit analysis when w < –3A and when w > A. In these regions the negative or high positive value of r, along with knowledge of the value of A, enables President to infer the value of w.
Issuing a cost-benefit analysis thus would be costly but it would not reveal any information.
President has no incentive to demand the cost-benefit analysis—that is, threaten to reject any
project that is not accompanied by a cost-benefit analysis—because in these regions President
does better as a result of the project than in the status quo. In addition, the outcome does not
change when 0 < w < A, the region in which President and Agency cannot both be benefited by a
project because they have conflicting interests. With or without cost-benefit analysis, even with
k = 0, Agency could not issue a project that benefits itself and that President would approve.
When –3A < w < A, Agency’s use of a high-value project (r = 4A) results in outcomes that
are higher than both President and Agency want. If k is sufficiently small, Agency would issue
the cost-benefit analysis voluntarily, and President would approve the project. Suppose, for example, that w = –2A. Without cost-benefit analysis, the project is r = 4A, and the outcome is 2A.
With cost-benefit analysis, Agency could choose project r = 3A, in which case the outcome, A, is
the same as Agency’s ideal point and closer by A to President’s ideal point of 0. Given our assumption that k is small, Agency would voluntarily issue the cost-benefit analysis.
The same argument can be made about the region in which –A < w < 0. Incomplete information prevents Agency from issuing a project that makes both Agency and President better off.
If k is low enough, Agency can issue the same project with a cost-benefit analysis, and President
will approve it. The only difference between this case and the previous case is that in this case,
starting at –A, President will no longer accept projects greater than –2w, and accordingly
Agent’s projects will be no higher than –2w.
The argument so far reproduces our earlier analysis—in which cost-benefit analysis converted an incomplete information game into a full information game—except that it makes
more explicit the choice of whether to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. If k is sufficiently small,
the equilibria are exactly the same. What we learn from endogenizing cost-benefit analysis is
that (1) sometimes Agency will not issue a cost-benefit analysis but in these cases its failure to
do so is justified because the project value itself gives President complete information; and (2)
otherwise Agency will issue a cost-benefit analysis voluntarily, without needing to be compelled
by President. These two points provoke reflection, for they suggest that the Regan and Clinton
44

We elaborate on this assumption in Part I.F (the blunt signal theory).
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executive orders were unnecessary. Presidents gain nothing from cost-benefit analyses when
agencies would not otherwise be inclined to perform them, and when presidents benefit from
cost-benefit analyses, agencies have the right incentives to perform them. We return to this puzzle in the next two sections.
F.

Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Precise or Blunt Signal

Cost-benefit analysis was assumed to be costless (or nearly costless) and perfect, but other
assumptions are more plausible. One alternative assumption is that cost-benefit analysis is
costly and inaccurate (“blunt signal”). Another assumption is that cost-benefit analysis is costly
and precise: any cost-benefit analysis costs some amount, k, but k increases with the inefficiency
of the regulation (“precise signal”).45
The preceding section considered the blunt signal case when the cost of the signal, k, is insignificant. As k increases, the analysis changes. The most interesting difference is that the
agency can now signal by issuing an uninformative cost-benefit analysis46 rather than by issuing
a high-value regulation. Consider the case where w = –2A, and the equilibrium project in the incomplete information version of the game is r = 4A, resulting in an outcome of 2A. Recall that
Agency issues this high-value project in order to persuade President that w equals –2A rather
than a number closer to 0. A large expenditure on a cost-benefit analysis—one that results in the
inability of Agency to implement other projects that it values—could similarly persuade President that w is far from 0. For if it were close to 0, Agency would not gain enough from the project to justify the expenditure of k. If this is right, then Agency would be able to issue a lower
value regulation like r = 3A, and this regulation would be better for both Agency and President.
What is interesting about this argument is that the cost-benefit analysis might not distort political outcomes as much as the high-value regulation. We would rather Agency persuade President that air pollution is a problem by issuing an expensive but meaningless cost-benefit analysis than by forcing factories to install scrubbers that are more expensive than necessary.47
Under the precise signal theory, k is a decreasing function of the efficiency of the project. To
simplify, suppose that k = 0 when r = –w and k is otherwise some high cost k’, which we interpret as the cost of “faking” a plausible cost-benefit analysis. For example, if w = –2A, Agency
can either issue efficient project r = 2A and pay k = 0, or issue inefficient but Agency ideal project
r = 3A and pay k’. If President believes any cost-benefit analysis, then Agency will choose r = 2A
if –(2A – 2A – A)2 > –(3A –2A – A)2 – k’, that is, k’ > A2. President will believe a cost-benefit analysis only if this inequality is met.48 The inequality shows that the more that Agency’s goal diverges from President’s, the more effective the cost-benefit analysis must be in distinguishing ef-

45

Compare Scott Ainsworth, Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence, 55 J Pol 41, 51–52 (1993), who models the influence of lobbyists on legislatures. Costly lobbying is a signal that may distinguish lobbyists who care more or care less about an issue. By contrast, we assume that the agency sends the signal, and although the signal may reveal how much the agency cares, this
means the location of w, not the location of A.
46 Such as a cost-benefit analysis that relies on expensive but unreliable contingent valuation surveys. For criticism of this
method, see the essays in Ian J. Bateman and Kenneth G. Willis, eds, Valuing Environmental Preferences (Oxford 1999).
47 Compare Pablo T. Spiller and Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial
Review, 26 J Legal Stud 347, 361–62 (1997), in which cost-benefit analysis is a decision cost imposed on the agency.
48 The left side of the inequality is Agency’s utility from issuing the efficient regulation: -(r+w-A)2-k, where r = 2A and k = 0.
See note 35. The right side is Agency’s utility from issuing the Agency’s best regulation along with the fake cost-benefit analysis: (r+w-A)2-k’, where r = 3A and k’ > 0.
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ficient and inefficient projects. If the inequality is not met, President will not believe the costbenefit analysis, Agency will not bother to engage in it, and the incomplete information outcome will result.
Outcomes under the precise signal theory are not always better than outcomes in the original model. As before, Agency will not always issue a cost-benefit analysis if w > 0 or w < –3A. In
these regions the high value of the project itself reveals sufficient information or (when 0 < w <
A) Agency and President cannot both benefit from the same project.
There is an important difference between the original model and the precise signal theory.
In the original model Agency has no incentive to choose efficient projects if President’s ideal
point is far from efficiency. In the precise signal model, this is no longer true. Because the costbenefit analysis is cheaper if the regulation is efficient than if it is inefficient, Agency has a new
incentive to issue efficient regulations: the incentive to minimize expenses, thus preserving
funds for other projects. If cost-benefit analysis is a precise signal, Agency’s regulations will be
biased in the direction of efficiency.
It is clear that this bias benefits a President whose ideal point is close to efficiency. But it
also benefits a President whose ideal point is less interventionist than efficiency and a President
whose ideal point is more interventionist than efficiency but closer to 0 than to A. The antiintervention President benefits because all regulations are lower value than they would otherwise be. The President whose ideal point is positive but close to 0 benefits because regulations
will tend to produce outcomes closer to 0 than to A. It is only the extremely pro-intervention
President who would not benefit from cost-benefit analysis if the precise signal model is correct.
In sum, cost-benefit analysis improves policy outcomes for President and Agency in a
range of plausible circumstances. The only case in which it does not is when: (a) cost-benefit
analysis is a blunt signal that is also very expensive; or (b) cost-benefit analysis is a precise signal and President is sufficiently more interventionist than efficiency requires. As in the original
model, Presidents who do not care strongly about efficiency may benefit from obliging Agency
to perform cost-benefit analyses.
However, we still have not solved the puzzle described in the previous section, namely,
why President would need to order Agency to perform cost-benefit analysis. Agency would do
it on its own if the procedure has the benefits that have been described. For while cost-benefit
analysis is expensive, it improves the probability that the regulation will be approved. Further,
if President does order Agency to engage in cost-benefit analysis, that should not change equilibrium behavior. President has no way—in the model—to punish Agency if it does not comply.
These last implications are examined in the next section.
G.

Dynamic Considerations

One might argue that the static nature of the game conceals President’s ability to sanction
agencies that routinely fail to issue plausible cost-benefit analyses. Consider a dynamic version
of the game, in which the three periods are repeated indefinitely. One might think that in such a
game President would threaten to reject all projects, or some large number of projects, after
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Agency fails to issue a cost-benefit analysis or a plausible cost-benefit analysis. It is well-known
that in infinitely repeated games such a threat could be credible.49
This argument, however, makes no sense in the game that we have been considering. Recall
that when Agency does not want to issue a cost-benefit analysis, President would not want
Agency to issue a cost-benefit analysis. And when a cost-benefit analysis benefits President,
Agency has every incentive to supply one. There is simply no need for President to order Agencies to issue cost-benefit analyses, to threaten Agencies with punishment if they fail to issue
cost-benefit analyses, or to punish Agencies that fail to issue cost-benefit analyses.50
Then how do we explain the Reagan and Clinton executive orders? The most likely answer
is that these orders had no more than a marginal effect on the behavior of agencies,51 and that
the executive orders were exercises in public relations or symbolic politics. As I will argue below, the evidence suggests that regulations issued under these executive orders were less efficient than those issued before them; and that many if not most of the regulations issued under
these orders have been accompanied by cost-benefit analyses of dubious value and were approved nonetheless.52 The executive orders probably did stimulate coordination among the
agencies, and a greater sophistication in the use of cost-benefit analysis, and some valuable academic research on valuation methodologies. The executive orders may have in these ways led to
a reduction in the cost of cost-benefit analysis, and an enhancement of its accuracy. Cost-benefit
analysis in the 1970s was not a sophisticated methodology and the agencies, in the absence of
some hint from the president, probably doubted that it could help them get regulations approved, especially in an atmosphere in which regulation was considered more urgent than it is
today. What agencies needed, but what they did not get until the 1980s and 1990s, was centrallyorganized coordination and instruction. As cost-benefit analysis became cheaper, it would become more attractive as a tool for justifying regulation.
II. COMPLICATIONS
A.

The President’s Maximand

We have generally assumed that the president seeks efficient outcomes, although we have
already relaxed this assumption in the section on costly signals. In this section, we discuss in
more detail the case in which the president does not seek efficient outcomes but seeks to maximize the probability of reelection, and does so by making transfers to various interest groups
and constituents.
One might think that if the president does not care about efficiency, then cost-benefit analysis could play no useful role. The president would not benefit from knowing that an agency’s

49

See Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information 123–29 (2d ed 1994).
Indeed, consistent with the discussion in the text EPA did publish cost-benefit analyses, or loose approximations thereof,
beginning in 1970. By 1979 it had produced 427 “economic analyses.” Richard N.L. Andrews, Economics and Environmental Decisions, Past and Present 56, in Smith, cited in note X.
51 Indeed, in the 1970s the EPA and some other agencies did conduct a large number of analyses that had cost-benefit aspects
to them but were generally not rigorous or complete. See Richard N.L. Andrews, Economics and Environmental Decisions, Past and
Present, in Smith, ed, Environmental Policy under Reagan’s Executive Order 43, 56 (cited in note 27) (describing quality of cost-benefit
analyses performed by agencies in the 1970s).
52 See text accompanying notes 96–102.
50
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proposal is cost-justified. The relevant information would be whether that proposal benefits the
president’s constituents. It turns out that this intuition is wrong.
As an example, consider Figure 4, where E represents the efficient policy. P remains the
President’s ideal point, represented as 0, but now assumed to be more interventionist than efficiency requires.

______________________________________________

–1

w

E

P=0

A

1

Figure 4
w = –2A
Suppose w = –2A. We know from the earlier analysis that with incomplete information
Agency will choose r = 4A, resulting in outcome 2A. Now introduce cost-benefit analysis. The
efficient project would be r = E – w, resulting in outcome E. However, Agency and President
would prefer a higher value project, for such a project would move the outcome closer to
Agency’s and President’s ideal points. Agency would in fact choose r = A – w = 3A, resulting in
outcome A. Because A is closer to 0 (President’s ideal point) than 2A, cost-benefit analysis makes
President better off. But it does not result in an efficient project; the project would fail the costbenefit analysis.
Why would an efficiency-indifferent president order agencies to conduct cost-benefit
analysis? The answer is that the cost-benefit analysis yields valuable information that President
can use in deciding whether to approve or reject Agency’s regulation. It is important to see that
the cost-benefit analysis is just a device for analyzing and reporting information; it does not
compel any particular response unless President or some other authority is committed to punishing an agency that implements cost-unjustified projects. The additional information benefits
President regardless of whether President’s ideal point is the same as efficiency, and the reason
is that additional information is a good thing to have, regardless of one’s goals. This is why both
a relatively anti-environment president like Reagan and a relatively pro-environment president
like Clinton would order agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis. Both benefited from the additional information, even if each would choose to use it in a different way.
The results change if cost-benefit analysis is enforced by courts rather than by the president
or another political actor like Congress. To analyze this case, we need to introduce the judiciary,
the topic of the next section.
B.

The Role of the Courts

An issue that is neglected in the literature on cost-benefit analysis is whether this instrument is enforced by political sanctions or by legal sanctions. To understand this distinction, consider the different approaches of two bills proposed in the Senate, one in 1995 and the other in
1999.
The 1995 Senate bill, S 623, states:
(a) No final rule . . . shall be promulgated unless the agency finds that
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(1) the potential benefits to society from the rule outweigh the potential costs of the rule to
society . . . .
...
(b) The requirements of this section shall supplement the decisional criteria for rulemaking
otherwise applicable under the statute granting the rulemaking authority, except when
such statute contains explicit textual language prohibiting the consideration of the criteria
set forth in this section.53
In addition, the bill provides that courts “shall set aside agency action that fails to satisfy the decisional criteria of section 623.”54
The 1999 Senate bill, S 746, states:
If the agency head determines that the rule is not likely to provide benefits that justify the
costs of the rule or is not likely to substantially achieve the rule making objective in a more
cost-effective manner, or with greater net benefits, than the other reasonable alternatives
considered by the agency, the agency head shall –
(A) explain the reasons for selecting the rule notwithstanding such determination, including identifying any statutory provision that required the agency to select the rule;
(B) describe any reasonable alternative considered by the agency that would be likely to
provide benefits that justify the costs of the rule and be likely to substantially achieve the
rule making objective in a more cost-effective manner, or with greater net benefits, than the
alternative selected by the agency; and
(C) describe any flexible regulatory option considered by the agency and explain why that
option was not adopted by the agency if the option was not adopted.55
In addition, that bill provides that courts shall not review the regulations solely on the basis of
its satisfaction of the cost-benefit analysis, but may treat it as relevant for overall review of the
rule.56
The Reagan and Clinton executive orders are both similar to the 1999 bill. Although the
Reagan executive order requires agencies to comply with their cost-benefit analyses, it does not
authorize courts to reverse regulations that violate cost-benefit analysis.57 The Clinton executive
order does not even require agencies to comply with their cost-benefit analyses. Rather, it requires them to conduct cost-benefit analysis and report the results.58 But as a practical matter the
two executive orders have the same effect. They order agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis but leave sanctions to the executive branch to impose on noncomplying agencies if it wishes.

53
54
55
56
57
58

S 343 § 623 at 2058 (cited in note 17).
Id § 624(d) at 2058.
S 746 § 623(d)(2) (cited in note 17).
Id § 627(d).
Exec Order No 12291 § 9, 3 CFR at 133–34.
Exec Order No 12866 § 6(a)(3)(B)-(C), 3 CFR at 645–46.
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It is thus clear that elected officials understood that cost-benefit analysis can be enforced in
two different ways: by political sanctions and by legal sanctions. What is the difference between
these two approaches?
Political sanctions enable Congress and the president to retain control over the agency’s incentives. In our simple model, President’s political sanction is to reverse Agency’s project. This
means that an inefficiency-minded president will approve a regulation that is inefficient but
beneficial to the president. When cost-benefit analysis is enforced by political sanctions, it does
not cause agencies to act efficiently, it causes them to issue regulations closer to President’s ideal
point, whatever it is, than the regulations the agencies would issue under incomplete information.
Judicial sanctions, which transfer control of the agency’s incentives from the political
branches to the judicial branch, introduce new issues. Courts have their own ideal points, and
these are not necessarily the same as efficiency.59 If a court’s ideal point is sufficiently close to
President’s or Congress’s, or if a court enforces the law rather than its own ideological goals,
then the introduction of judicial preferences do not present any special problems to the analysis.
Otherwise, the analysis becomes complex in ways that cannot be discussed here.
Suppose that a court seeks to enforce the law. If the court had perfect information, it would
vacate all regulations that are not efficient, that is, that do not achieve policy outcome 0. In this
simple case, judicial enforcement aids the government to the extent that the government’s ideal
point approximates efficiency. There is a twist, however. Agency will not propose projects when
0 < w < 2A, because the efficient project (p = –w) would make Agency worse off or (in the case of
w = 2A, in which case the efficient project is r = –2A) no better off. Judicial enforcement of costbenefit analysis does not ensure efficient outcomes when agencies retain discretion not to issue
regulations.60
Because courts have imperfect information, agencies have more room to maneuver. If, to
take the extreme, courts had no information, they would be in the same position as President in
the original incomplete information model. The difference is that presidents approve projects
that make them at least as well off as the status quo, whereas we assume that courts approve
only those projects that are efficient. As a result, outcomes would be closer to efficiency although signaling would still occur. If w = –1, for example, Agency could no longer issue regulation r = 1 + A, because the court would infer that w = –1, conclude that the outcome is greater
than E < 0, and strike down the regulation. For high and low w’s, Agency would issue r = –w + E
rather than r = –w + A. Signaling would still occur in the lower middle range but the outcomes
would still be closer to 0 than in the absence of cost-benefit analysis.
Judicial enforcement of cost-benefit analysis under incomplete information clearly benefits
efficiency-minded presidents. What is more surprising is that it may benefit anti-efficiency
59 For models that explore the influence of judicial ideology on political outcomes, see Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717 (1997) (analyzing judicial decisions in terms of, amongst others, the party of the
president who nominated the judge); Pablo T. Spiller and Matthew L. Spitzer, Where is the Sin in Sincere? Sophisticated Manipulation of
Sincere Judicial Voters (With Applications to Other Voting Environments), 11 J L, Econ & Org 32, 36–51 (1995) (discussing how political
ideology of the judge can affect political outcomes).
60 Unless citizens can sue agencies for failing to act. See National Customs Brokers & Forwarders Association of America, Inc v
United States, 883 F2d 93, 96 (DC Cir 1989) (noting that “refusals to institute rulemaking proceedings . . . are subject to judicial
check,” but that the “scope of that review” was “extremely limited and highly deferential”). But see Heckler v Chaney, 470 US 821,
832, 833 (1985) (agency enforcement actions are presumptively not subject to judicial review).
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presidents as well. Consider Figure 4, again, and suppose that E = –A/2. Observe that the antiefficiency President (P > E) does better if Agency issues regulation r = –w + E (which produces
outcome E), than if Agency is subject to cost-benefit analysis enforced by political sanctions and
issues regulation r = 3A (the complete information result, producing outcome A) and if Agency
is not subject to cost-benefit analysis at all and issues regulation r = 4A (the incomplete information result, producing outcome 2A). Presidents who are not much more interventionist than efficiency or, it turns out, less interventionist than efficiency prefer judicial enforcement to political enforcement.61 The stronger judicial sanction compensates for the distance between the judicial outcome and President’s ideal point.
We can summarize as follows: when cost-benefit analysis is enforced by political sanctions,
President is made better off, because Agency loses its informational advantage. But it does not
follow that the outcomes will be efficient. If President and Agency are more interventionist than
efficiency requires, outcomes will also be more interventionist than efficiency requires. When
cost-benefit analysis is enforced by courts, then President will be made better off (1) as President’s ideal point approaches efficiency; and (2) as Agency’s ideal point becomes increasingly
higher than President’s. It remains true that a President with nonefficiency goals can benefit
from judicially enforced cost-benefit analysis.
C.

Congress as Principal; Multiple Principals

Cost-benefit analysis has become common over the last two decades mainly because of executive orders issued by Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and for that reason scholars associate
cost-benefit analysis with the executive branch. The natural treatment of cost-benefit analysis
from a positive political theory perspective, then, is the president as principal and the agency as
agent. But Congress also has shown an interest in cost-benefit analysis. Several regulatory statutes require agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis,62 and others have been interpreted to
permit agencies to use cost-benefit analysis.63 And, as noted earlier, there have been efforts to
enact bills that require almost all regulatory agencies to use cost-benefit analysis regardless of
the language in the authorizing statute.64
Who is the principal, then, the president or Congress? The answer is that both are, to a degree. On the one hand, Congress has the ultimate authority to delegate regulatory power to the
agencies; indeed, one might think of the president as an agent of Congress.65 On the other hand,
the president has an independent political base, and this creates authority to pursue projects
through the agencies, whose personnel are members of the executive branch and subordinates
of the president. The truth is that the lines of authority are tangled, and it is plausible to treat
the president and Congress as independent principles, and any given agency as a joint agent.
For clarity, we discuss (1) Congress as the sole principal; and (2) Congress and the president as
joint principals.

61 The argument is the same as the explanation for why presidents who are anti-intervention or moderately pro-intervention
benefit from cost-benefit analysis under the precise signal theory. See Part I.F.
62 See 7 USC § 136(bb); 15 USC § 2605(c).
63 See Part IV.C.
64 See notes 17, 53-57.
65 Most of the literature on agency delegation does treat Congress, rather than the president, as the principal.
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1.

Congress as the principal.

Assume that Congress has a unitary interest, and that it cannot directly implement its goals
legislatively because of the press of time, uncertainty, and lack of specialization. Congress creates an agency and directs it to implement a general authorizing statute. The agency is likely to
have interests that diverge from Congress’s, just as the agency’s interests are likely to diverge
from the president’s. The reasons are that Congress does not have full control over the personnel of the agency, and Congress’s interest will change over time. Congress can sanction the
agencies in various ways; for now, consider the bluntest sanction: the ability to reverse an
agency project by enacting a new law (with or without the help of the president).66
We need not devote much space to the Congress-agency axis because the analysis is the
same as either the president-agency analysis or the judicial analysis. In the absence of costbenefit analysis, the agency has two sources of power: its ability to set the agenda and its superior information. The result is the same as the equilibrium described in Figure 2. The agency
will use its agenda-setting power to bias projects in a more interventionist direction than Congress desires. The information asymmetry results in the agency choosing more extreme projects
over a range of low values of w, and declining to implement projects when w is negative and
close to 0. (See Table 2). If Congress directs agencies to perform and report cost-benefit analyses,
and retains the power to impose political sanctions, then the analysis is the same as the president-agency case: Congress learns the location of the status quo and can reverse projects that
fail to produce an outcome closer to Congress’s ideal point than the status quo.67 However, if
Congress legislatively requires agencies to comply with cost-benefit analysis, and gives courts
the task of enforcing this requirement, then the analysis is the same as the judicial case: costbenefit analysis will be desirable only when Congress’s ideal point is close enough to efficiency
or sufficiently less interventionist than Agency’s.68
2.

Congress and the President as principals.

There are different kinds of multiple principal problems. One conflict is between Congress
and the president. Another conflict is between members of Congress, or between congressional
committees,69 or between House and Senate, or between the parties that control different elements of the executive, legislature, and judiciary. A natural question is whether the existence of
conflicting principals increases or reduces the attractiveness of cost-benefit analysis. We focus
on the simplest conflict, between the president and a unitary Congress.
66 This is not at all uncommon. One recent example, chosen at random, is Congress’s reversal of the FCC’s low power FM radio rules. For a discussion, see Steward Benjamin, Douglas Lichtman, and Howard Shelanski, Telecommunications Law and Policy
325–32 (2001). However, legislative rejection is not exactly the same as presidential rejection (in the model). It requires collective action, rather than unilateral action, of course, and a supermajority unless the president cooperates. And if it does not occur before the
final rule is issued, Congress must decide whether to make the override prospective or retroactive, and in the latter case various judicial constraints may come into play.
67 Congress will need a two-thirds majority if, as seems likely, the president will not go along with reversal of the agency. See
US Const Art I, § 7, cl 2.
68 See Part II.B.
69 Much work focuses on congressional committees, treating them as the relevant principals in the relationship with agencies.
In Epstein and O’Halloran’s recent book, for example, the committee has partial information about w, and reports a bill to the floor.
The floor, which has no information about w, then decides on the content of the bill and whether to delegate to an agency. In the latter case, the president sets the agency’s ideal point, and then the agency observes w and sets policy. See Epstein and O’Halloran
(cited in note 25).
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It turns out that cost-benefit analysis has limited value when principals have conflicting
ideal points. To see why consider Figure 5.

case 1
case 2

________________________________F______I_________
–1 w = –2A C = –A P = 0
A
2A
1
P = –A C = 0
Figure 5

F marks the outcome in the full information (cost-benefit) version of the game, and I marks
the outcome in the asymmetric information version, given the assumption that w = –2A. Case 1
is identical to the assumptions of the earlier analysis of the game except Congress’s ideal point,
C, is inserted between P and w (Congress is assumed to be less interventionist than President).
Case 2 reverses the locations of P and C, and assumes that C=0 and P<0. The other parameters
remain the same and are not reproduced in the figure.
Assume that Congress and President must agree in order to reverse Agency’s project, and if
they reject Agency’s project, the status quo prevails.70 Focus on case 1. In the full information
version of the game, Agency will choose r = 3A just as in the earlier model without Congress.
This project is Agency’s best, because it achieves Agency’s ideal point. The project is worse for
Congress than the status quo, but because the project improves President’s utility, President will
not agree to reject it. In short, the addition of Congress does not change the outcome of the earlier model, and that is true in the incomplete information version of the game as well. Agency
chooses r = 4A in order to signal that w is relatively low. Given that President approves the project, Congress cannot influence the outcome even though Congress would, if it could act by itself, reject the project.
One immediately observes that if the locations of President and Congress are reversed (case
2), the analysis does not change. The difference is that now Congress has influence and President does not, and Agency’s outcomes will not make Congress worse off but will make President worse off compared to the status quo.
The conclusion of this very simple examination is that cost-benefit analysis is desirable for
two principals just as it is desirable for one principal, because it permits the principals to learn
about Agency’s action. But the benefit of cost-benefit analysis diminishes as the conflict between
the two principals increases.71 The reason is that when principals cannot agree, they are in a
poorer position to discipline an agency that chooses an extreme project.72 Thus, one conjectures
that cost-benefit analysis becomes less likely to be required as the number of principals rises

70 There are plausible alternative assumptions: for example, that Congress or President can unilaterally reverse the regulation.
This would reduce Agency’s agenda-setting power, forcing it to choose a project within the acceptance region of the more distant
principal. This is an improvement for the principals only when their ideal points are close and the status quo is close to their ideal
points; otherwise, regulation may become impossible.
71 See Matthew D. McCubbins, The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, 29 Am J Pol Sci 721, 741–42 (1985) (arguing that
when legislators’ interests conflict, they are less likely to give discretion to an agency).
72 In the single principal game the introduction of cost-benefit analysis increases President’s utility by 16A2 (see table X and
square the value of the improvement for President). In the two-principal game the introduction of cost-benefit analysis increases
each principal’s utility by 4A2 on average (assuming that each principal is in each position with probability 0.5), or jointly by 8A2.
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and their ideal points diverge.73 This may explain the difficulty in enacting a statute that compels agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis: Congress might think that such a statute will
have little effect if it is not unified enough (internally, or with the president) to impose political
sanctions on agencies that fail to comply with cost-benefit analysis.
D.

The Role of Interest Groups and the Public

In many models in positive political theory interest groups may reveal information to Congress that enables Congress to discipline the agency. The following example is taken from Epstein and O’Halloran.74

_______________________________________________
–1
w
I
P=0
A
1
Figure 6
Interest Group’s ideal point is I,75 and in our example I < P < A. Think of Agency as the EPA
and Interest Group as the Business Roundtable: Agency seeks more aggressive regulation and
Interest Group seeks less aggressive regulation. It is assumed that Interest Group, like Agency,
knows the location of w. The time line is now: (1) w is determined; (2) Agency proposes the project, p; (3) Interest Group announces to President that it opposes or endorses the project; and (4)
President accepts or rejects project.
In the complete information version of the model Interest Group cannot affect the outcome.
Agency proposes a regulation, r > 0, that brings the outcome closer to Agency’s ideal point, but
chooses an r just low enough to make President indifferent between the project and the status
quo. Because Interest Group has no information that President lacks, its announcement to
President will be ignored.
In the incomplete information version of the model, however, Interest Group can affect the
outcome under certain conditions.76 Suppose that w falls just below I (technically, –A+2I < w < I).
Interest Group prefers a low-value project, President a medium-value project, and Agency a
high-value project. Agency knows that Interest Group will refuse to endorse a project that creates an outcome farther from I than the status quo is. President also knows this, and can use this
information along with knowledge about the closeness of A and I to estimate the location of w.
For example, if A and I are very far apart, Agency proposes a low-value project, and Interest
Group rejects the project, President can infer that w is very close to I, because otherwise Interest
Group would benefit from a project that increases the outcome only a little bit from a status quo
73 In the extreme case where one principal has an ideal point greater than Agency’s, the more interventionist principal will
never reverse Agency in the single principal model and will never agree to reverse Agency in the two principal model. Thus introducing cost-benefit analysis does not change the Agency’s utility. The other principal’s utility is improved in the single principal
model but not in the two principal model because in the latter model the other principal never consents to reversal of the project. We
will not discuss the even more complex case when the two principals have different amounts of information about w.
74 Epstein and O’Halloran, 11 J L, Econ & Org at 237–39 (cited in note 31). We use President where they use Congress.
75 Interest Group’s utility function is UI = -(r + w – I)2.
76 See Epstein and O’Halloran, 11 J L, Econ & Org at 237–39 (cited in note 31) (showing region where proposals will be moved
to the edge of the endorsement region so Interest Group does not sound off an alarm).
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much worse than I. Another example is when r is high and Interest Group endorses the project.
President knows that if Interest Group endorses the project, w must be very low, in which case
the project will benefit President as well. This is like an anti-regulation business group endorsing a costly anti-pollution regulation issued by the EPA. One infers that the environmental
problem must be very bad if the business group endorses it.77
The Interest Group’s informational advantage, coupled with the conflict between President
and Agency, gives the Interest Group power to bias outcomes. If President will obey Interest
Group’s message under certain conditions, then Agency knows that under those conditions it
must propose a project that makes Interest Group at least as well off as in the status quo. For example, if w = I, Interest Group will disapprove any project; President will obey Interest Group’s
message because in this region on average Interest Group’s message is credible; and so Agency
will not bother to propose a project r > 0, even though a relatively low value project could make
Agency and President better off.78
The lesson is that interest groups sometimes help government principals control agencies
by disclosing information to the principals.79 But in providing this help interest groups can bias
project outcomes in a way that benefits them.
The effect of cost-benefit analysis is striking. By revealing the location of w, it eliminates Interest Group’s informational advantage. Lacking that advantage, Interest Group cannot influence Agency’s choice of project. Thus, cost-benefit analysis reduces the influence of interest
groups.
This argument is more complex than it appears. The argument is not that cost-benefit
analysis eliminates the influence of interest groups altogether. This would occur only if costbenefit analysis became the mandatory (constitutional) standard for all legislation and executive
action.80 In the model, interest groups retain a hidden influence on the location of the other
players’ ideal points. Through campaign contributions interest groups move the ideal points of
Congress and the president left or right; and possibly affect the ideal points of the agency by
holding out the prospect of employment and other future benefits to the agency’s personnel
who are friendly. This does not change when cost-benefit analysis is introduced.81 What does
change is that the interest group loses the leverage that superior information gives it. It cannot

77 Interest Group’s statements will not always be credible, in which case President will not pay attention to them when deciding what to do. For example, if r < 0, President knows that w must be greater than A and that the project will not reduce the outcome
below A. Because w is greater than A and A is greater than P, President benefits from the project and will approve it regardless of Interest Group’s statement.
78 For a graphical analysis, see Epstein and O’Halloran 11 J L, Econ & Org at 238, fig 3 (cited in note 31) (showing equilibrium
where I < P < A).
79 This is an important theme in the positive political theory literature, and underlies a number of theories of interest group
lobbying. See, for example, Potters and Van Winden, 74 Pub Choice at 270–71 (cited in note 43) (explaining how lobbying information can influence legislators); Ainsworth, 55 J Pol at 41 (cited in note 45) (arguing that legislators take measures to avoid undue interest group influence); Banks and Weingast, 36 Am J Pol Sci at 509–11 (cited in note 36) (assuming that politicians have access to interest group information in assessing agencies); David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright, Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator’s Vote,
9 Soc Choice & Wel 229, 229–33 (1992) (developing a model showing that interest groups can influence legislators by providing important information).
80 In essence, the claim of those who would constitutionalize the efficiency rule in order to eliminate rent-seeking.
81 It is possible that cost-benefit analysis enhances the ability of interest groups to lobby by supplying information to Congress
and the president about the effect of agencies’ projects. This would be true only if interest groups start off with inferior information,
which seems doubtful for industry groups, though it may be true for public interest organizations and grass roots movements.
Thus, cost-benefit analysis could have a more complex effect than that described in the text, leading indirectly to changes in the
players’ ideal points.
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use its superior information to influence President and, through President, Agency, with the result that outcomes will be closer to President’s ideal point than they would be in the absence of
cost-benefit analysis.82 This is an attractive feature of cost-benefit analysis, one to which I will return below.83
E.

Relation to Other Techniques of Agency Control

The argument so far has made simplifying assumptions about the tools at the president’s
and Congress’ disposal for monitoring agencies and punishing agencies that issue unwanted
regulations. We assumed that President can punish Agency only by rejecting (or blocking or delaying) a project, with the result that the status quo would prevail rather than an outcome
nearer to Agency’s ideal point. We assumed that Congress can punish Agency in the same way,
and also by directing courts to reject projects. In all of these cases, the sanction endured by
Agency is the loss of an opportunity to change the status quo in a direction that it prefers. But
Congress and the president have other tools at their disposal.
1.

Requiring notice and public participation.

The Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to give notice before issuing regulations, and accept comment from the public.84 These requirements force agencies to divulge information in advance of their action, which permits the government principal to intervene and
redirect the agency’s resources if necessary. These requirements also enable interest groups to
learn of impending regulations and alert the government principal.85
2.

Firing agency chiefs.

Suppose the head of the agency cares little about policy but does want a reputation for loyalty to the president. In the case of ordinary regulatory agencies, the president can discipline the
agency by threatening to fire the agency head if the agency’s projects depart too far from the
president’s ideal point, or by threatening to withhold future positions that would otherwise be
the reward for loyal behavior. If the president’s threat is credible—and it will be, as long as there
are other loyal and competent people who can take over the position—the agency head will approve projects closer to the president’s ideal point. This is not as clearly true for independent
agencies. The president can punish heads of independent agencies only by withholding future
benefits, not by firing them.86 Otherwise the president can punish these agencies by joining
Congress in enacting punitive legislation.87
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Assuming as always that President’s ideal point is not too far from efficiency.
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (cited in note 23), make a similar point about the publicity requirements of the APA.
84 5 USC § 553 (explaining notice and comment procedure).
85 See McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 3 J L, Econ & Org at 256–59 (cited in note 23).
86 For an argument that under current law the president has some supervisory power over independent agencies, see Richard
H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U Chi L Rev 1, 29–34 (1995).
87 The president can also discipline the independent agencies through the Department of Justice, which has the power to intervene in agency proceedings, through control of some agency personnel and facilities, and through OMB supervisions of legislative proposals issued by the agencies. See Stephen G. Breyer, Richard B. Steward, Cass R. Sunstein, and Matthew L. Spitzer, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Tex, and Cases 100–102 (4th ed 1999); Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of Independent Regulatory Process, 8 Admin L J 461, 500–504 (1994).
83
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3.

Appointing agency chiefs.

The president can also ensure that the agency’s projects are desirable by appointing as head
of the agency only people whose ideal points are close to the president’s.88 If the agency head
controls the agency’s behavior, then the agency’s and the president’s ideal points will be close to
each other, and as a result the projects desired by the agency will be to the president’s liking.
4.

Modifying the agency’s budget, internal procedures, and jurisdiction.

The president and Congress have the power to punish wayward agencies by reducing the
agency’s budget. This prevents the agency from implementing as many projects as it would like
to.89 The president and Congress can also modify the agency’s procedures in various ways. For
example, they can require environmental impact statements. These requirements increase the
expense of projects, thus having the same effect as a decrease in the budget. Finally, Congress
and the president can strip agencies of jurisdiction or impose heavier legal standards on them.
They can also restrict the power of one agency by requiring it to work with another agency.90
5.

Oversight.

Much discussed in the positive political theory literature is the ability of Congress to control agencies by holding hearings on the agency’s actions, which may generate bad publicity for
the agency and interfere with its activities.91
6.

Other standards: risk-risk.

Agencies could be directed to use decision procedures other than cost-benefit analysis. A
number of scholars have argued for the risk-risk standard, which holds that a regulation should
be rejected if the risks it reduces are offset by increased risks.92 The problem with this standard
compared to cost-benefit analysis is that it neglects relevant considerations. As an example, consider estrogen therapy which reduces risks associated with menopause, including the risks of
heart disease and osteoporosis, but increases the risk of certain cancers. Risk-risk analysis directs the decisionmaker to weigh these risks, but it has little to say about how the risks should
be weighed. One might think that life expectancy ought to be the proper standard—that the
therapy ought to be approved if it increases life expectancy—but that approach does not take

88 See Randall L. Calvert, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33
Am L Pol Sci 588, 602–03, 607–08 (1989) (showing that appointment power of executives tends to bring in agency officials who agree
with president’s preferences). Compare Daniel F. Spulber and David Besanko, Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate, 8 J
L, Econ & Org 126, 152 (1992) (pointing out how appointment, statutes and oversight help the president and Congress control administrative agencies).
89 See Randall L. Calvert, Mark J. Moran, and Barry R. Weingast, Congressional Influence over Policymaking: The Case of the
FTC, in Congress: Structure and Policy (Matthew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan eds. 1987).
90 See Mathew D. McCubbins and Talbot Page, A Theory of Congressional Delegation, in McCubbins and Sullivan, Congress
(cited in note 89); McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 3 J L, Econ & Org 260–71 (cited in note 23), for discussion. An example of jurisdiction sharing is OHSA’s ability to regulate only those health hazards identified by the national Institute of Occupational Safety
and Health. The two agencies are controlled by different Congressional committees. Id at 267.
91 See, for example, Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire
Alarms, 28 Am J Pol Sci 165, 165–67 (1984) (discussing Congress’s oversight abilities).
92 John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Weiner, eds,
Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment 1, 19-41 (Harvard 1995) (developing a framework for risk tradeoff
analysis). For a discussion of other standards, like qualys, see Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 233–38 (cited in note 20).
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account of the cost of having an unpleasant but not life-threatening disease, as well as all the
other quality of life costs that the therapy is intended to alleviate, including hot flashes and discomfort during sexual intercourse.93 If the agency is not permitted to assign costs to these factors, then it is hard to see how the use of the risk-risk procedure will improve the welfare of citizens or have much political support. If the agency is required to assign costs to all risks, and to
do so in a systematic way, then risk-risk converges to cost-benefit. But this much can be said
about the procedure: it may reduce agency discretion partially, and in a way that is closer to the
principals’ ideal points than in the case of cost-benefit analysis. If so, one might observe its use
as a disciplinary device despites its many problems.
These tools enable the government principal to control agencies in a variety of ways, and
they surely enhance the principal’s control over agencies beyond the power to block or delay the
project (in the case of the president) or overturn it by legislation (in the case of Congress). But
introducing these tools into the original model does not change its qualitative results. Agencies
will choose projects somewhat closer to President’s and/or Congress’ ideal points when the latter do not conflict too much, but agencies will continue to bias the outcomes in their own favor.
When information is incomplete, signaling will occur with its losses on all sides. Every one of
these alternative tools, moreover, has limited power because, in the end, the government principal does not want to constrain agencies so much that the latter cannot accomplish anything. Reducing the budget, stripping jurisdiction, hiring and firing agency heads, and harassing agencies with oversight hearings will interfere with good projects as well as bad projects.
III. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
The argument so far has two sets of empirical predictions. The first set concerns the effect
of the introduction of cost-benefit analysis on policy outcomes. The second set concerns the
conditions under which government principals will want to impose cost-benefit analysis on existing agencies. We focus initially on the simple model with President and Agency.
The first set of predictions is that the introduction of cost-benefit analysis results in (1) more
projects being implemented, including projects that fail cost-benefit analysis (see Table 2, row 3);
and (2) lower value regulations being implemented when w is negative but not too low (see Table 2, row 2). In addition, (3) the increase in the number of projects described in prediction (1),
and the reduction in the value of regulations over the range described in prediction (2), will be
greater as Agency’s ideal point increases relative to President’s.
The second set of predictions is that President is more likely to require Agency to engage in
cost-benefit analysis as (4) Agency’s ideal point becomes higher than President’s, and (5) costbenefit analysis becomes cheaper and more precise.94

93 Evridiki Hatziandreau, Constance Williams, and John D. Graham, Estrogen Therapy for Menopause, in John D. Graham and
Jonathan Baert Weiner, eds, Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment 42, 43–50 (Harvard 1995) (explaining
risks of menopause and menopause therapy).
94 There are other predictions, as well: that the precise signal version of cost-benefit analysis is more likely to be used when
President’s ideal point is close to efficiency, but that the blunt signal version of cost-benefit analysis is no more nor less likely to be
used when President’s ideal point is close to efficiency; that cost-benefit analysis is less likely to be used as President and Congress
have greater conflicts; and that Interest Groups will have less influence over regulations governed by cost-benefit analysis than
regulations not governed by cost-benefit analysis.
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These predictions are not easy to test. One problem is selection bias. If one observes a pool
of Agencies with different ideal points, and only some of them are required to engage in costbenefit analysis, it could be that the agencies engaging in cost-benefit analysis implement fewer
projects than the other agencies (contrary to prediction 1). The reason is that if the other agencies have ideal points close enough to President, the latter will approve all or nearly all their
projects; whereas agencies with distant ideal points that engage in cost-benefit analysis will not
implement projects between 0 and A (see Table 2, row 4).
There are also countervailing forces that have been identified. If cost-benefit analysis is sufficiently expensive or blunt, its introduction may reduce rather than increase the number of projects. If President cares little about efficiency and cost-benefit analysis is enforced by courts or is
a precise signal, predictions will be weaker. And if Congress has an ideal point sufficiently different from President’s, cost-benefit analysis may not restrain agencies much at all.95 Finally, one
would need to hold constant a large number of complex variables, including the agency’s
budget and personnel; the degree to which the existing legislative standards depart from or approximate cost-benefit analysis; economic and ideological trends; and the incentive that Congress and the president would have to create an agency in the first place when they anticipate
that ideological conflict will make it difficult to discipline the agency.96
Still, some of the predictions are consistent with impressionistic evidence. Consider the
prediction that the introduction of cost-benefit analysis would result in more regulation, including regulation that fails cost-benefit analysis. This is a striking prediction, and conflicts with the
common-sense expectation that the introduction of cost-benefit analysis would result in the reduction of the amount of regulation and certainly the reduction of the amount of inefficient
regulation. The evidence is more consistent with the prediction of the model. Consider Figure
7.
<<Figure 7 here>>97
The graph in Figure 7 displays major health and safety regulations issued by government
agencies between 1967 and 1989. The x-axis represents the year of promulgation, the y-axis
represents the cost per life saved in thousands of dollars. Although cost per life saved is not the
same as efficiency, it is a useful proxy for these regulations because they are directed toward
problems of health and safety.98 The vertical line shows the year of Reagan’s executive order,
1981. The horizontal line represents a regulation that assumes a three million dollar value for a
statistical life, a standard efficiency assumption. The graph shows no noticeable trend toward

95 A further complication is that the relevant variable may be the Congressional committee that has jurisdiction over the
agency in question. See Epstein and O’Halloran, Delegating Powers (cited in note 25).
96 For empirical work showing that agencies are responsive to sanctions, and thus to the changing goals or identities of principals, see Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulating Policymaking by the Federal
Trade Commission, 91 J Pol Econ 765, 792–93 (1983) (concluding the FTC empirically responds to congressional sanctions); Terry M.
Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 Am J Pol Sci 739, 765–72 (1984) (alleging that legislators and agencies fit well in a hierarchical model that allows legislators to exert control over agencies); Nathaniel Beck, Elections and the Fed: Is there a Political Monetary
Cycle?, 31 Am J Pol Sci 194, 198–99 (1987) (noting that “presidential preferences are a key determinant of Fed policy.”).
97 Cost per life saved is in thousands of constant 1984 dollars.
98 A four million dollar environmental regulation that saves one statistical life and also enhances the recreational value of a
wilderness by two million dollars is an efficient regulation even though the cost per life saved is four million dollars. A more accurate accounting would accordingly take into account benefits other than reduced mortality. But it seems unlikely that the post-1981
regulations have a larger non-mortality component than the pre-1981 regulations.

30

greater efficiency after the executive order. (There are in fact many efficient regulations before
and after 1981, but this is difficult to see because of the scale; also some post-1981 outliers are
omitted to keep the scale within reasonable bounds). This is confirmed by regressions,99 but is
more clearly illustrated in Figure 8.
Efficient

Total

no

yes

pre-1981

5

7

12

post-1981

17

18

35

Total

22

25

47

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.1711 Pr = 0.679
Figure 8
Figure 8 divides the regulations according to whether they were issued before or after 1981
(vertical) and whether they are “efficient” or not (horizontal). It is clear visually and statistically
that the efficiency of regulations does not increase after 1981. A little more than half are efficient
in both periods. This evidence is bolstered by studies that show that post-1981 cost-benefit
analyses are frequently defective. Agencies often provide implausible estimates of costs and
benefits, use different discount rates and valuations across regulations, and even fail to
monetize or quantify all the relevant costs and benefits.100 One study of forty-eight rules issued
99 See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: Assessing the Government’s Numbers, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory
Studies, Working Paper 99-6, 27, table 7 (July 1999); Scott Farrow, Improving Regulatory Performance: Does Executive Office Oversight
Matter?, manuscript 22, table 4 (July 26, 2000). Both authors examined health and safety regulations issued before and after 1981,
and found no statistically significant relationship between their cost-effectiveness and a dummy variable representing whether the
regulation was issued before or after 1981. (Although the authors name this dummy variable OIRA because their studies focus on
that institution, once cannot separate out the effect of OIRA and the cost-benefit executive order. This does not matter because the
role of OIRA starting with Reagan was to implement the cost-benefit program.).
100 Hahn’s review of all 168 final and proposed rules issued from 1981 through mid-1996 found that only 26 percent of the rules
were accompanied by an estimate of monetized benefits, Hahn, Regulatory Reform at 6, table 1, and that 23 percent of the rules were
accompanied by a statement that the benefits exceed the costs, id at 41 table 9. Hahn’s own calculations indicate that about 43 percent of the rules would pass a cost-benefit test, depending on various assumptions. See id at 43 table 10. Hahn and his coauthors
also reviewed 48 RIA’s published from 1996 to 1999, and found that agencies presented monetized costs and benefits for only 19
percent of the rules. See Robert W. Hahn et al, Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12, 866, 23 Harv J L & Pub Pol 859, 871 (2000). See also Office of Management and Budget, Report to Congress on the
Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, chapter III (September 30, 1997) (reporting that of 21 economically significant rules issued
in the past year, agencies supplied monetized costs in eight cases and monetized benefits in sixteen cases); W. Norton Grubb et al,
The Ambiguities of Benefit-Cost Analysis: An Analysis of Regulatory Impact Analyses under Executive Order 12291, 154, in V. Kerry Smith,
Environmental Policy under Reagan’s Executive Order (1984) (finding that individuals in the Department of Agriculture performed
“perfunctory” cost-benefit analyses using “incomprehensible” numbers both before and after the Reagan executive order; Winston
Harrington et al, On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, Resources for Future Discussion Paper 99-18 (January 1999) (finding in a
study of 25 regulations that agencies tend to overestimate the costs of complying with regulations); Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government’s Numbers Tell Us?, in Robert W. Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs and Lives Saved (1996) (finding that 38 of 83 rules
proposed or issued from 1990 to 1995 passed a cost-benefit test); Arthur Fraas, The Role of Economic Analysis in Shaping Environmental
Policy, 54 L & Contemp Probs 114, 124 (1992) (pointing out errors in RIAs for lead phasedown and asbestos regulations); Maureen L.
Cropper et al, The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making 140, in Roger D. Congleton, ed,
The Political Economy of Environmental Protection (1996) (finding that EPA’s pesticide regulations implicitly value statistical lives in a
range between sixty thousand dollars and thirty-five million dollars); Edward R. Morrison, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U Chi L Rev 1333, 1364–69 (1998) (finding that agencies use a wide range of discount rates). This
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between 1996 and 1999 concluded that the “RIAs typically do not provide enough information
to enable the regulatory agencies to make decisions that will maximize the efficiency or effectiveness of the rule.”101
We have not confirmed our prediction that cost-benefit analysis increased the inefficiency
of regulation, but we have shown substantial evidence that the alternative prediction—that it
increased the efficiency of regulation—is false. Further work will be necessary to establish that
the number and inefficiency of regulations increased, and that the increases were caused by the
increasing transparency of regulation. If Reagan, Bush, and Clinton had no interest in efficient
regulation, but did have an interest in ensuring that agencies made regulatory transfers to the
right interest groups, then their cost-benefit orders, coupled with their freedom to reward or
sanction agencies in whatever way they wanted to, would have the predictable effect of increasing the amount and inefficiency of regulation.102
The second set of predictions concerned the likelihood that a president would order agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis. One of the predictions was that the likelihood increases
with the ideological distance between President and Agency. Reagan’s executive order of 1981 is
consistent with this prediction. When Reagan entered office, the agencies had been controlled
by and staffed by a Democratic president and a Democratic Congress, in the latter case for many
years. But this was hardly a necessary condition for his executive order. Clinton, like Reagan,
benefited from agencies’ cost-benefit analysis because it gave him information about what agencies were doing. What is surprising is not that a Democratic president would require agencies to
use cost-benefit analysis but that it was not used by presidents before Reagan.
There are many possible reasons for this. It may be that before the 1980s the methodology
was not sufficiently developed, especially for environmental and safety regulation. Or it may be
that the cost and delay associated with cost-benefit analysis was considered too high a price to
pay for information at a time (the 1970s) when environmental regulation was considered urgent.103 Or it may have been that agencies feared that if they used cost-benefit analysis, this procedure, because of its transparency, would have made them vulnerable to judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act, and its attendant costs and delay. If courts tended to defer to
agencies because they did not feel qualified to second guess the decisions of experts made on
the basis of a tremendous, indigestible mass of data, agencies might have shied away from presenting the data and analysis in a way that would have facilitated judicial review. Or it may
have been, as Figures 7 and 8 suggest, that cost-benefit analysis was unnecessary because the
early regulations were efficient!
A test of prediction 4 is to look at whether cost-benefit analysis is imposed more rigorously
on agencies whose ideal points are far from the president’s than on agencies whose ideal points
are close. Because Reagan and Clinton ordered nearly all regulatory agencies to perform costbenefit analysis, testing this prediction is possible only if one can distinguish agencies against
which the executive orders were rigorously enforced by OMB and those against which they
literature is large, and this is just a sample.
101 Hahn, et al., Assessing, 23 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 861 (cited in note 100).
102 Further work is necessary to investigate the other predictions; for example, that the ideological distance of president and
agency influences the effect of introducing cost-benefit analysis.
103 See Andrews, Economic and Environmental Decisions at 52–56 (cited in note 51) (noting the acceleration of environmental programs and agencies in the 1970s).
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were weakly enforced. Anecdotal evidence suggests, for example, that Reagan’s OMB was
stricter with the EPA than Clinton’s OMB was.104 If the distance between Reagan’s ideal point
and his EPA’s ideal point was greater than the distance between Clinton’s ideal point and his
EPA’s ideal point—and this seems likely even though both presidents appointed the head of the
EPA—then this is consistent with the prediction. A more systematic test would be feasible if the
ideological positions of agencies or agency heads could be measured.
Congress first became enthusiastic about cost-benefit analysis in 1995, and since then has
tried several times to require agencies to comply with this procedure. The clear explanation is
divided government: the Republican majority in Congress elected in 1994 sought to limit the
discretion of Clinton appointees.105 The weaker 1999 bill, which unlike the 1995 bills did not
provide for direct judicial enforcement of the cost-benefit analysis, was passed in a much less
ideologically charged environment.106 This story is consistent in a loose way with the blunt signal theory: by imposing a cost on agencies when both the agencies and the president had more
interventionist ideal points than Congress did, Congress would move policy outcomes in its desired less interventionist direction.107
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A.

A (Qualified) Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis

The literature on cost-benefit abstracts away from its institutional role. Authors typically
compare the outcomes produced by cost-benefit analysis with the outcomes that are normatively desirable, and defend or criticize cost-benefit analysis according to its accuracy in implementing the normative goals. A common criticism, for example, is that because cost-benefit
analysis gives more weight to the preferences of the wealthy than to the preferences of the poor,
it approves projects that have objectionable distributive consequences.108 A common defense
concedes that cost-benefit analysis generates errors—in the sense of outcomes that are not socially desirable—but that it also economizes on decision costs. On this view cost-benefit analysis
minimizes the sum of decision costs and error costs compared to alternative decision procedures.109

104 See Breyer et al, Administrative Law, at 122 (cited in note 87) (OIRA under Reagan was criticized for being too aggressive,
OIRA under Carter was criticized for being too cautious). For example, OSHA did not appear to believe that Clinton’s OMB would
compel it to interpret its vague workplaces safety statute to require cost-benefit balancing. See International Union, UAW v OSHA, 37
F3d 685 (DC Cir 1994).
105 Spiller and Tiller, 26 J Legal Stud at 361 (cited in note 47) (explaining the history behind the proposed Comprehensive
Regulatory Reform Act of 1995).
106 In 1995 there were 236 Republicans; 197 Democrats; and one independent (and one vacancy) in the House; in 1999 there
were 222 Republicans, 212 Democrats, and one Independent in the House. In 1995 there were 53 Republicans and 46 Democrats
(and one vacancy) in the Senate; in 1999 there 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats in the Senate. Partisanship declined dramatically in
the House, from 73 percent to 43 percent, and slightly in the Senate, from 69 percent to 63 percent. (The numbers refer to the percentage of recorded floor votes in which a majority of one party voted against a majority of the other party.) See Congressional
Quarterly Almanac v 51, pp. B-6, B-7, C-8 (1995); v 55, pp. A-14, A-15, B-7.
107 Loose, because we do not consider the ability of Congress to control the president, as opposed to controlling agencies. But
the argument is intuitive.
108 Kelman, 5 Reg at 36–40 (cited in note 22) (showing that in doing cost-benefit analysis of non-market items, economists are
forced to make value judgments about these items); Harry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J Legal Stud
971, 972–73 (2000) (arguing that at its best, cost-benefit analysis crudely considers distributional issues).
109 For a discussion of this view, see Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J (cited in note 28).
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This debate is mired in intractable philosophical and empirical questions. The philosophical question is what the proper normative goal of government is. If one believes that government should not concern itself with its citizens’ well-being, for example, or should be concerned
mainly with redistributing wealth, cost-benefit analysis will appear unattractive. Although costbenefit analysis is consistent with a broad array of normative commitments,110 it does not follow
that people holding any of these commitments would prefer cost-benefit analysis to another
procedure. These considerations depend on the errors created by cost-benefit analysis in light of
the normative goal, and this question introduces a difficult empirical issue, namely, how much
cost-benefit analysis reduces decision costs.
Another problem with this debate is that it assumes that although agencies may err, they
loyally try to implement the goals of the principal, whether the principal is understood as the
president, Congress, or the public. But this assumption is wrong. If agencies could be depended
on to do whatever the principals wanted, there would be little need for Congressional oversight,
the OMB, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the many other institutions and laws that are
intended to prevent agencies from pursuing inappropriate goals.
Critics of cost-benefit analysis frequently overlook this institutional dimension.111 They
seem to think of the regulatory agency as a School of Athens in which the discovery of truth is
the only end, and hierarchical superiors will take for granted the agency’s loyalty and good
faith. But if agencies cannot justify their behavior without forcing busy elected officials to reproduce their deliberations, then the purpose of creating agencies in the first place is defeated.
Critics of cost-benefit analysis must supply not only an alternative evaluative method for agencies—for example, “intelligent policy analysis . . . open to refashioning aims and remaking ends
in light of new information about pros and cons”112—but also an account of how review of agencies’ decisions made under this method is to proceed. If the evaluative method is opaque to review, then the method, however subtle and ingenious, must be rejected. And this would be true
even if the loyalty of agencies were unquestioned. For surely it would be unwise to shield even
exemplary regulatory activity from public scrutiny and debate.
Thinking about cost-benefit analysis as an instrument of control—that is, as a means for reducing agency costs—casts new light on its justification. It also enables one to evaluate costbenefit analysis without plunging into the philosophical and political controversies about the
proper normative goals of government. We limit ourselves to the following normative assumption:
Agencies should implement the goals of the principals.113
Let us start with the simplest case, and then add complexities. In the simplest case, the government principal seeks efficient projects. If the principal cannot control the agency, the agency

110 Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 194–216 (cited in note 28) (discussing how cost-benefit analysis increases the moral criterion of “overall well-being”).
111 See sources cited in note 24. Amartya Sen acknowledges the trade-off between, as he puts it, usability and acceptability, but
because he ignores the institutional reason for this tradeoff—the principal-agent problem—he is unable to justify the particular
tradeoff that he advocates. See Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J Legal Stud 931 (2000).
112 Richardson, Stupidity at 1003 (cited in note 24).
113 There are some complexities that we must ignore because of lack of space. The main complexity is the ambiguity about
whether the relevant goals are those of the enacting Congress (or legislative coalition, including (or not) the president) and the current Congress (and/or president) who in fact (unlike the earlier principals) exert control over agencies. This important, difficult
problem justifies the independence of courts, and possibly of agencies as well, but lies outside the scope of this paper.
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would implement projects that it prefers rather than the projects that the principal prefers. If
this problem is serious enough, the principal might not create the agency in the first place. Costbenefit analysis mitigates this agency problem by making it easier for the principal to monitor
the agency. The principal can sanction the agency now if the agency implements projects that
fail cost-benefit analysis. Although cost-benefit analysis is not a panacea—the agency retains its
bargaining power and can implement projects that the principal barely prefers to the status
quo—the agency’s discretion is reduced, and the principal’s welfare is enhanced.
In the more realistic case, the principal cares not only about efficiency but also about satisfying various constituents. Cost-benefit analysis, however, retains its value. In terms of the
model, it reveals the location of the status quo, which enables the principal to determine
whether the project produces an outcome too far from its ideal point. As long as the principal
has the discretion to sanction the agency, it need not discipline an agency that implements an
inefficient project that the principal likes. It can also discipline an agency that implements an efficient project that the principal does not like. In short, cost-benefit analysis reveals information
to the principal, and the principal can use this information to punish agencies that deviate from
the principal’s interests, whatever these interests happen to be.
If cost-benefit analysis is not cheap, it becomes a cruder though still valuable instrument.
Cost-benefit analysis serves as a blunt or precise signal that distinguishes projects that agencies
value a lot from projects that agencies value less. Because the principal knows the location of the
agency’s ideal point, it can use the signal to infer the location of the status quo. This permits the
principal in a range of cases to sanction agencies that implement projects that do not make the
principal better off.
In still more complex cases, the principal is internally divided. The president’s interests differ from those of Congress, and members of Congress may have conflicting interests as well. As
conflict increases, cost-benefit analysis loses its value, but so does any kind of delegation to
agencies.114 Given that our normative premise is that the “principal”—Congress and the president, or some coalition—has goals that agencies should implement, we have nothing to say
about cases where the principal is not unified.115
The principal relies on other mechanisms to control agencies. Some of these mechanisms
are substitutes for cost-benefit analysis and others are complements. The president’s ability to
punish an agency head enhances the value of cost-benefit analysis: the ability to punish is more
effective with full information than with partial information. This argument applies as well to
Congress’ ability to strip agencies of jurisdiction, reduce their budgets, and interfere with their
internal procedures. Lobbying by interest groups may be a substitute for cost-benefit analysis,
but only a partial substitutes except in rare cases where an interest group and the principal’s interests are identical or nearly identical. But lobbying also distorts the political process. Another

114 McCubbins, 29 Am J Pol Sci at 738 (cited in note 71) (theorizing that an increasing amount of conflict among legislators decreases the scope of agency discretion).
115 Although Pildes and Sunstein, Reinventing, at 11–16 (cited in note 86) treat cost-benefit analysis as an instrument for asserting executive power over the federal bureaucracy, with the executive orders representing just the most recent moves in a long chess
game between the president and Congress, the truth is that cost-benefit analysis can also be an instrument of congressional power,
as recent legislative activity has shown. One can believe that requiring agencies to use cost-benefit analysis is a good way of making
agency behavior visible to elected officials without taking a position on whether the elected officials charged with supervision of
agencies should be in the executive or legislative branch.
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virtue of cost-benefit analysis is that it reduces the ability of interest groups to use their information advantages to influence political outcomes.
There are also other standards that could be used in the place of cost-benefit analysis. Riskrisk evaluation, for example, could play a role similar to that of cost-benefit analysis. Their value
relative to cost-benefit analysis depends on (i) whether they measure attributes of the environment more accurately than cost-benefit analysis, and (ii) whether they are less manipulable than
cost-benefit analysis.116
Finally, courts should enforce cost-benefit analysis when the principal’s goal is sufficiently
close to efficiency, or the principal is sufficiently anti-interventionist. When this is not true, costbenefit analysis retains its value as long as it enforced only by political sanctions. But even in
this latter case courts can play a role in assessing the quality of cost-benefit analysis. We will
discuss this role in the next section.
In sum, cost-benefit analysis becomes a more desirable instrument as:
(1) The agency’s goals diverge from the principal’s.
(2) The principal’s goal is less intervenionist, or not too much more interventionist, than efficiency (if cost-benefit analysis is judicially enforced or it serves as a precise signal).
(3) The goals of components of the principal—the president, members of Congress—
converge.
(4) The regulated activity can be reliably monetized or quantified.117
(5) The difficulty of monitoring the agency increases.
(6) The difficulty of sanctioning the agency or agency head declines.
These conditions favorable to cost-benefit analysis are not always met, and that is why we
do not have a government that compels all agencies to make their decisions on the basis of costbenefit analysis. But they seem to be met enough of the time to justify broad executive and
statutory mandates to use cost-benefit analysis.
B.

The Role of Courts

We have emphasized the distinction between judicial enforcement of cost-benefit analysis
and enforcement by the “government,” that is, the president or Congress. The president has the
option to sanction the agency whose project fails a cost-benefit analysis.118 Thus if the president
likes such a project, the president does not have to sanction the agency. By contrast, the court
has no choice. If the law directs it to vacate regulations that fail cost-benefit analysis, then it
cannot refrain when it sees that the project is attractive to the government. The mandatory nature of judicial enforcement weakens the attractiveness of cost-benefit analysis when the government’s ideal point is not the same as efficiency. In addition, courts are generalists and they
are not in a good position to conduct their own cost-benefit analyses in order to correct the
agencies’ analyses.

116

See text accompanying note 92.
There are cases in which this is not so. Imagine, for example, that an agency is given the authority to determine ethical constraints on medical research funded by the federal government. Cost-benefit analysis cannot resolve such issues as the use of fetal
tissue, because the underlying controversy is moral not welfarist. People’s valuations in one direction are unlikely to be relevant. See
Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 243–45 (cited in note 28) (noting the cost-benefit analysis may not properly assess nonwelfarist considerations, such as fair distribution).
118 Part II.E.
117
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These problems suggest a subtler role for the court: not to enforce cost-benefit analysis but
to enhance its value as a signal. Recall that in our signaling models, cost-benefit analysis becomes a more effective means for separating good projects from bad projects as the signal becomes more precise. If cost-benefit analysis is a blunt signal—that is, a cost that does not vary
with the efficiency of the project—it may have some value, but that value is limited. As costbenefit analysis becomes a more precise signal—that is, a cost that declines with the efficiency of
the project—it has increasing value, even if the principal’s ideal point is not efficiency, though it
must be close. The court’s purpose should be to enhance the value of the cost-benefit signal for
the president and Congress, not to force agencies to issue only those regulations that pass a
cost-benefit analysis. Courts should try to raise the difference between the cost of issuing a
plausible cost-benefit analysis of an efficient project and the cost of issuing a plausible costbenefit analysis of an inefficient project.
This signal refinement theory has several implications. First, it is not as important for courts
to insist that agencies use the “right” valuations for any given regulation as that they use consistent valuations across regulations. For example, an agency should not be permitted to value a
statistical life at seven million dollars in one regulation and then three million dollars in another, even though both valuations are within the range of plausibility. The reason that courts
should not determine their own valuations is that they are insufficiently specialized. They
should nonetheless demand consistency on the part of agencies because the ability to opportunistically change valuations lowers the cost of issuing a plausible cost-benefit analysis of inefficient regulations. Courts should demand consistency within agencies for all kinds of valuations,
including items like discount rates. But courts should not necessarily demand consistency
across agencies. Agencies may face authorizing statutes with different ideal points, reflecting
different public policy concerns.119 If, as it appears, Congress demands stricter regulation of carcinogenic substances than other health and safety hazards, and thus agencies implementing the
cancer regulations assume higher valuations of life, it is not—on our normative assumption that
the principal’s goals are fundamental—the role of the court to demand consistency, though Congress’ decision may be wrong.120
Second, when costs and benefits are not readily monetizable—and this includes the value
of environmental amenities—courts should not necessarily demand that agencies monetize
them. The problem here is that a monetized valuation may be arbitrary.121 But courts can nevertheless improve the signal by demanding quantification, if possible (for example, the use of life
years), and requiring consistency across regulations. If quantification is not possible, an agency
should provide a reasoned, nonboilerplate discussion of why the valuation cannot be quantified. The court can also demand that the agency engage in detailed surveys of people’s views
about a proposed project. Even if the valuations requested are not reliable, the costly effort signals the agency’s commitment to the project.
Third, the court should take account of the ideal point of the agency. The farther the agency
is from the ideal point of the winning coalition (which may or may not be equivalent to effi119

Agencies should be permitted to change valuations only when they can point to relevant research or legislation that was issued after the last regulation.
120 See Part III.C on these valuations, the criticisms of scholars, and the evidence that the strict laws were a response to the public’s uniquely powerful fear of cancer.
121 See Adler and Posner, 29 J Legal Stud at 1116–20 (cited in note 12), on monetization of environmental goods.
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ciency), the stricter the demands the court should make on the agency. It should be more willing
to vacate a regulation issued by an extreme agency than a regulation issued by a moderate
agency.122
Fourth, the court should take account of the ability of the political branches to sanction the
agency. As the ideal points of the political branches converge, and as they become more distant
from that of the agency, the court should be more willing to approve a regulation, even one in
which the cost-benefit analysis is of low quality. The reason is that the political branches, which
have better information than the court about their own ideal points, are in a better position to
discipline the agency.123
Fifth, the courts should be less willing to enforce cost-benefit analysis in the absence of
statutory authorization, and the more that the winning coalition’s ideal point deviates from efficiency. Put differently, the winning coalition’s valuations—for example, a higher than current
valuation of life—should be permitted to inform the cost-benefit analysis. This requirement
boils down to an injunction against forcing cost-benefit analysis onto Congress when it has nonefficiency goals.
C.

Cases on Cost-Benefit Analysis

The cases illustrate some of these ideas. In Public Citizen v Young,124 the court vacated the
FDA’s determination that some cancer-causing color additives may be used in food and drugs.125
Normal consumption of the additives in question posed a smaller cancer risk than eating a single peanut or spending seventeen hours in Denver rather than Washington, D.C.126 Although the
statute prohibited use of additives that pose any cancer risk, the FDA reasoned that there must
be an implicit de minimis exemption. If not, and these additives were prohibited, manufacturers
might switch to noncarcinogenic additives that pose a higher risk to health – as only carcinogenic additives were covered by the statute.127
The court vacated the FDA’s decision even though, as the court appeared to believe, it
would surely have passed a cost-benefit test. The court argued that the legislative history and
the absolute language in the statute indicated that Congress was responding to public hysteria
about cancer, and was trying to show that it was responsive to the public’s fears.128 Congress
sought more interventionist regulation than efficiency (narrowly conceived) demanded.129
This case is consistent with the fifth implication discussed above, that courts should not
force Congress to adopt efficiency as a standard. A statute that increases noncancer deaths more
than it reduces cancer deaths is prima facie inefficient. Although it may be that calming public
122 See, for example, Matt Spitzer and Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J Legal Stud 679, 679–80 (2000) (concluding that courts
scrutinize more where a stronger ideological gap is present).
123 The third and fourth implications are subject to a complication, which is whether the court should consider the existing
congress or the original coalition.
124 831 F2d 1108 (DC Cir 1987).
125 Id at 1122–23.
126 Id at 1111.
127 Id at 1113.
128 Id at 1113–19.
129 By contrast, when Congress was less clear about its goals, a court permitted the agency to consider the costs and benefits of
the regulation. See NRDC v EPA, 824 F2d 1146, 1163 (DC Cir 1987) (en banc) (concluding the EPA could consider cost and benefit
factors because clear congressional intent was lacking). It is straightforward that an alternative result would interfere with using
cost-benefit analysis as a signal in this context.
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fears or showing concern for public fears should count as a benefit that outweighs the costs of
the statute, it is doubtful that an ordinary cost-benefit analysis would measure these advantages. But it is not the role of courts to strike down statutes because they are inefficient or appear inefficient because of intangibles, and thus it cannot be their role to vacate regulations that
properly implement such statutes. If the signal refinement view is correct, the court vacates inefficient regulations only when (1) the statute permits cost-benefit analysis, and (2) the costbenefit analysis was badly performed. In Young the first condition was not met.
In International Union, UAW v OSHA,130 the court held that the Occupational Safety and
Health Act’s vague guidance to OSHA—which required OSHA to adopt “the standard which
most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity”131—did not permit OSHA to adopt “feasibility” alone
as a sufficient condition for issuing a regulation, and it struck down a regulation promulgated
under this standard.132 The court encouraged OSHA to use a cost-benefit standard instead.133 In
this case and other cases as well, courts adopt cost-benefit analysis as a default standard that
agencies may use, and perhaps should use when the statute is ambiguous.134 The cases can be
read as warnings to agencies that if they do not use cost-benefit analysis, their regulation is subject to remand once again for further explanation. If they do use it, they are in a safe harbor, and
may expect that their regulation will survive a challenge if the cost-benefit justification is plausible. International Union and the other cases are consistent with the blunt signal version of costbenefit analysis: they force agencies to incur the expense of cost-benefit analysis or a similar
procedure.
Other cases go farther and describe what counts as good and bad practice in calculating
costs and benefits. These cases are consistent with the precise signal version of cost-benefit
analysis, for they increase the cost of manipulating data in order to make an inefficient regulation appear cost-justified. The most striking example of such a case is Corrosion Proof Fittings v
EPA,135 which vacated a regulation of asbestos products.136 The court criticized EPA’s cost-benefit
analysis for:
1) Discounting only the costs of the regulation and not the benefits;137
2) Discounting from the time of exposure rather than from the time of injury;138
3) Calculating costs and benefits over a short period (thirteen years) rather than the life of
the regulation;139
4) Treating lives saved beyond the thirteen year period as “unquantified benefits” that
outweigh the expected costs of the regulation;140
130

938 F2d 1310 (DC Cir 1991).
Id at 1313.
132 Id at 1325–26.
133 Id at 1321. The court held that other standards may be permissible as well, but identified only cost-benefit analysis as a possibility, and described at some length what cost-benefit analysis entails.
134 See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles (cited in note 13). Michigan v EPA, 213 F3d 663, 678–79 (DC Cir 2000) (and cases
cited) (stating that the “preclusion of cost consideration requires a rather express congressional direction.”).
135 947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991).
136 Id at 1229–30.
137 Id at 1218.
138 Id.
139 Id.
131
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5) Using an unreasonably high valuation for life (forty-three to seventy-six million dollars
per life saved)141 compared to the valuations used in other regulations;142
6) Double-counting factors by including them in the cost-benefit analysis and using them as
a separate reason for regulation;143
7) Failing to take account of the risks of technologies to which industry would substitute as
a result of the regulation;144
8) Assuming that errors identified by opponents of the regulation balance out, rather than
performing a new cost-benefit analysis using the improved data.145
The court does not perform its own cost-benefit analysis and then use the results of this
analysis to evaluate the agency’s action. Indeed, the court gives EPA a great deal of discretion.
But it places limits on that discretion. EPA may choose among different valuations of life, but it
may not use a valuation that is significantly higher than those calculated by economists or used
in other regulations.146 It may choose a discount rate, but it must be within a plausible range,147
and the agency may not selectively discount some items and not others – for example, costs and
not benefits. The EPA may use unquantifiable benefits as a tie breaker when monetized costs
and benefits are close, but it may not use them to justify regulations that clearly fail the
monetized test.148 It must use the best available data; must look at all relevant costs and benefits;
must look at the relevant time period; must discount the relevant factors (injury not exposure);
and it may not double-count.149 All of these requirements are good practice but they leave the
agency substantial discretion to determine valuations. The result is a signal that is not blunt but
relatively precise. After Corrosion Proof Fittings, it is harder for an agency to fake a cost-benefit
justification of a regulation.
The signal refinement view that courts should be more concerned about accurate information disclosure than about the efficiency of regulations is further supported by Competitive Enterprise Institute v NHTSA.150 The court in that case was bothered that NHTSA refused to take
account of the risk to life that would result if NHTSA’s automobile mileage regulations forced
customers to switch to smaller cars. The court may have been willing to approve a regulation
that imposed such a risk. The point was to force that cost out into the open, so that the political
branches may respond if necessary (point three, above).151
Cost-benefit analysis is not the only way for an agency to send a signal. As argued above, a
procedure that quantifies the advantages and disadvantages of regulations may constrain agen140

Id at 1219.
Id.
142 Id at 1223.
143 Id at 1219.
144 Id at 1221. See also Competitive Enterprise Institute v NHTSA, 956 F2d 321, 326–27 (DC Cir 1992) (requiring NHTSA, in evaluating whether continued high fuel standards are justified, to take account of cost in lives lost if consumers switched to smaller cars).
145 Corrosion Proof Fittings, 447 F2d at 1227.
146 But see American Dental Association v Martin, 984 F2d 823, 825–26 (7th Cir 1993) (upholding OSHA’s bloodborne pathogens
rule and noting that the valuation for life saved of four million dollars was reasonable).
147 Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F2d at 1218 n 19.
148 Id at 1219.
149 Compare American Dental Association, 984 F2d at 826, which was somewhat more tolerant of the agency’s failure to consider
some costs.
150 956 F2d 321, 324–25 (DC Cir 1992).
151 Id.
141
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cies, and thus serve at least as a blunt, and perhaps as a precise, signal. In American Trucking Associations, Inc, v EPA,152 the court struck down the EPA’s particulate matter rule because it was
not accompanied by a plausible justification.153 Barred by its own precedent from demanding
that EPA use cost-benefit analysis, the court suggested that EPA use quality adjusted life years
or a similar standard to evaluate the regulation, but if no such standard were available, then the
statute would be an unconstitutional delegation. Seen through the lens of our analysis, the court
was not demanding from EPA proof that the regulation was efficient. Quality adjusted life
years cannot be used to establish efficiency. The court was demanding evidence that EPA placed
a particularly high value on the regulation, because the political branches would be able to use
this information when deciding whether to overturn the project.
The discussion so far supports the first two claims about judicial review of cost-benefit
analysis, and also the fifth, but says nothing about the third and fourth, according to which
courts should take account of the ideal point of the agency and the extent to which the political
branches are divided. Courts are rarely candid about these matters, and the only way to determine whether these claims are true is to conduct a statistical study of the distribution of case
outcomes.154 One predicts, for example, that courts are more likely to strike down regulations issued by agencies that have an interventionist or deregulatory reputation than regulations issued
by other agencies; and that courts are more likely to strike down regulations when the political
branches are ideologically divided. Such an investigation will have to wait for future work.
CONCLUSION
Many of the philosophical difficulties with cost-benefit analysis disappear when a principal-agent perspective is taken. It is not necessary to adjudicate among rival normative theories
of the proper role of government in order to determine whether agencies should use costbenefit analysis. The only important normative assumption is that elected officials should have
the power to set policy, not the agency. It is hard to imagine an attractive normative theory that
would give agencies power that their creators would want to deny them.
The justification of cost-benefit analysis also depends on empirical assumptions about (1)
how easy it is to manipulate cost-benefit data; (2) how effectively government principals can
discipline agencies; and (3) how far cost-benefit analysis results will usually be from president’s
and Congress’s goals if courts are supposed to enforce them.
These assumptions are innocuous in ordinary circumstances. Regarding the first assumption, it is not usually easy to manipulate cost-benefit data. Except when the regulation depends
to an unusual extent on hard-to-measure variables, the cost-benefit analysis will produce useful
information for the government principals, and even when the regulation depends on these
variables, cost-benefit analysis may be valuable as long as it is costly to perform. The agency’s

152

175 F3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999) (cert granted).
Id at 1053–55.
154 Compare Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, J Legal Stud
(forthcoming 2002); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717 (1997). Both of these
studies—and there are many others in the political science literature—discount the courts’ self-presentations as neutral purveyors of
the law, and attempt to show through the distribution of case outcomes and modes of review that the judges are influenced by hidden political factors.
153
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willingness to incur the cost, if it is high enough, gives the principals information about the location of the status quo.
The second assumption seems reasonable because the principals have a variety of tools for
disciplining agencies, and the evidence suggests that these tools are effective.155 The third assumption is necessary only when the courts are given the authority to enforce cost-benefit
analyses. But the courts are not always necessary, and indeed I have argued that their proper
use may be ensuring that the cost-benefit procedure is performed accurately, not that a regulation is cost-justified. When the principals can discipline agencies, they can prevent agencies
from implementing regulations that are efficient but that are too far from their ideal points.
When the principals seek regulations that are inefficient, they can simply write into the statute
that the agency must perform a cost-benefit analysis, or similar information-generating procedure, but need not follow it. This might seem implausible, but recall that it was the command of
the 1999 Senate bill. That bill required courts to ensure that the cost-benefit analysis is adequately performed but did not authorize them to vacate a regulation that fails it.
We have observed that cost-benefit analysis reduces the influence of interest groups on
regulations. When cost-benefit analysis reveals information for which the principals would otherwise have to rely on interest groups, the interest groups lose a source of their power. This is
surely a desirable feature of cost-benefit analysis, except in the theoretically possible, but implausible, case where interest groups provide information significantly more cheaply and accurately than cost-benefit analysis does, and over a wide enough range of projects.
Finally, we should emphasize that cost-benefit analysis makes agencies better off as well as
the principals, and this should surprise those who believe the critics of cost-benefit analysis.
EPA, for example, benefits from cost-benefit analysis because otherwise principals will trust this
agency less, and be unwilling to give it funds, jurisdiction, remedial power, and other needed
resources. Accordingly, citizens and interest groups who want to strengthen EPA ought to support cost-benefit analysis rather than criticize it. Their real target is not cost-benefit analysis,
which is merely a tool for monitoring the agencies, but the goals of the president and Congress
and the public that elects them. Given sufficient hostility for environmental regulation among
these principals, reducing their ability to monitor EPA is likely to lead them to undermine that
agency in other ways. The better strategy is to require EPA to use cost-benefit analysis, because
otherwise it will be difficult for EPA to justify regulation when the seriousness of the environmental problem would be acknowledged by people who are usually skeptical of environmental
regulation.156

155 For empirical discussions, see, for example, Smith and Tiller, The Strategy of Judging, J Legal Stud (cited in note ); Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, 83 Va L Rev 1717 (cited in note 154).
156 A possible example is the Reagan EPA on chlorofluorocarbons.
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Figure 7: cost-effectiveness of regulations by year (1984 dollars).
Source: W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs 264, table 14–5 (1992); John F.
Morrall III, A Review of the Record, 10 Regulation 13, 30 (1986).
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